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URBANISM UNDER GOOGLE:  LESSONS FROM 
SIDEWALK TORONTO 
Ellen P. Goodman* & Julia Powles** 
 
Cities around the world are rapidly adopting digital technologies, data 
analytics, and the trappings of “smart” infrastructure.  These innovations 
are touted as solutions to help rationalize services and address rising urban 
challenges, whether in housing, transit, energy, law enforcement, health 
care, waste management, or population flow.  Promises of urban innovation 
unite cities’ need for help with technology firms’ need for markets and are 
rarely subject to evidentiary burdens about projected benefits (let alone 
costs).  For the city, being smart is about functioning better and attracting 
tech plaudits.  For the technology company, the smart city is a way to capture 
the value of data flows—either by directly monetizing behavioral insights or 
by using those insights to design or acquire services—and then realizing the 
network effects and monopoly rents that have characterized information 
technology platforms. 
No company is more ambitious about exploring data flows and seeking to 
create and dominate networks of information than Google.  In October 2017, 
Google affiliate Sidewalk Labs embarked on its first prototype smart city in 
Toronto, Canada, through a collaboration with the public development 
authority Waterfront Toronto.  Together, the project partners are planning a 
new kind of data-driven urban environment:  “the world’s first neighborhood 
built from the internet up.”1  The vision is for a neighborhood featuring state-
of-the-art sustainable architecture, autonomous vehicles, sensor-based 
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 1. Emily Badger, Google’s Founders Wanted to Shape a City.  Toronto Is Their Chance, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/18/upshot/taxibots-sensors-
and-self-driving-shuttles-a-glimpse-at-an-internet-city-in-toronto.html 
[https://perma.cc/6APB-4K7M]; see also Daniel L. Doctoroff, Reimagining Cities from the 
Internet Up, MEDIUM (Nov. 30, 2016), https://medium.com/sidewalk-talk/reimagining-cities-
from-the-internet-up-5923d6be63ba [https://perma.cc/8L6P-SFZK]. 
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surveillance, and data-driven “responsive” services.  Much of the vision 
draws from leading city planning ideas and foregrounds progressive ideals 
of inclusivity and sustainability.  However, for the crucial first eighteen 
months of the venture, many of the most consequential features of the 
Sidewalk Toronto project were hidden from view and unavailable for serious 
scrutiny.  On basic questions about the proposed set of innovations, the 
players defied public accountability:  questions about data collection, data 
control, privacy, competition, and procurement.  Even more basic questions 
about the use of public space went unanswered:  privatized services, land 
ownership, infrastructure ownership, and, in all cases, the question of who 
is in control.  The net result is that there can be no confidence that the 
Sidewalk Toronto vision is compatible with democratic processes, sustained 
public governance, or the public interest.  This Article analyzes the Sidewalk 
Toronto project as it took shape in its first phase, prior to the release of the 
Master Innovation and Development Plan, and explores three major 
governance challenges posed by the imagined “city of the future”:  
privatization, platformization, and domination.  The significance of this case 
study applies well beyond Toronto.  Google and related companies are 
modeling future business growth embedded in cities and using projects like 
Sidewalk Toronto as test beds.  What happens in Toronto is designed to be 
replicated.  We conclude with some lessons highlighting the precarity of civic 
stewardship and public accountability when cities are confronted with 
tantalizing visions of privatized urban innovation. 
INTRODUCTION 
On Toronto’s eastern waterfront, a mile from the city center, there is a 
twelve-acre, L-shaped plot of land that would come to be known as Quayside.  
The property is largely owned by Waterfront Toronto (WT), a development 
corporation established in 2001 by the Government of Canada, the Province 
of Ontario, and the City of Toronto to assist in the renewal of Toronto’s 
waterfront.2  Quayside came to international attention on October 17, 2017, 
when Sidewalk Labs—a wholly owned subsidiary of the Google 
conglomerate Alphabet Inc.—became the official “innovation and funding 
partner” for the site.3  As such, it was tasked with helping to “create people-
centred neighbourhoods that achieve precedent-setting levels of 
sustainability, affordability, mobility, and economic opportunity” at 
Quayside and, more significantly, to potentially scale its ideas to the vastly 
more substantial 880-acre eastern waterfront, which encompasses the Port 
 
 2. About Us, WATERFRONT TORONTO, https://waterfrontoronto.ca/nbe/portal/waterfront/ 
Home/waterfronthome/about-us [https://perma.cc/PWM4-GKMA] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019); 
Who We Are, WATERFRONT TORONTO, https://waterfrontoronto.ca/nbe/portal/waterfront/ 
Home/waterfronthome/about-us/who-we-are [https://perma.cc/63XM-DMBP] (last visited 
Oct. 6, 2019). 
 3. New District in Toronto Will Tackle the Challenges of Urban Growth, WATERFRONT 
TORONTO (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.waterfrontoronto.ca/nbe/portal/waterfront/Home/ 
waterfronthome/newsroom/newsarchive/news/2017/october/new+district+in+toronto+will+t
ackle+the+challenges+of+urban+growth [https://perma.cc/5PPB-UG9H]. 
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Lands public redevelopment area adjacent to the site.4  With Sidewalk’s 
involvement, the small and otherwise unremarkable patch of postindustrial 
land at Quayside quickly became the centerpiece of a heated debate, 
nationally and internationally, about innovation, privatization, privacy, 
surveillance, control, and the future of cities and urban life. 
There was a certain giddiness to the relationship between Waterfront 
Toronto and Sidewalk Labs, evident not only in the proliferation of brightly 
hued concept papers and public demonstrations imagining new infrastructure 
for the site5 but also in the speed with which foundational agreements about 
the relationship between the parties and the bounds of the project were 
consummated—all outside of public view.  According to Ontario’s provincial 
auditor, the Board of Waterfront Toronto was given mere days to discuss and 
understand the implications of the initial “Framework Agreement” with 
Sidewalk, dated October 16, 2017, before being asked to approve it.6  It did 
so under intense pressure, given that the prime minister, the premier, and the 
mayor had all been lined up to make the announcement public only days 
later.7  Waterfront Toronto and Sidewalk kept this original Framework 
Agreement secret, apart from the release of a short summary.8 
Even Toronto city officials were kept in the dark as concerns about 
ownership and governance percolated and the project attracted intense public 
interest and media attention.9  It took nine-and-a-half months for the parties 
to release more details in another superseding agreement, the “Plan 
 
 4. Id. 
 5. Molly Sauter, City Planning Heaven Sent, E-FLUX ARCHITECTURE (Feb. 1, 2019), 
https://www.e-flux.com/architecture/becoming-digital/248075/city-planning-heaven-sent/ 
[https://perma.cc/Y7P2-FWBH] (“Sidewalk Toronto is, still, a digitally-bounded project, built 
out of renderings with persuasive power but no planning utility. . . .  [It is] fantastic, 
fantastical, and phantasmic.”). 
 6. 1 OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GEN. OF ONT., ANNUAL REPORT 2018, at 649 (2018), 
http://www.auditor.on.ca/en/content/annualreports/arreports/en18/v1_315en18.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/H8NC-QPEA] [hereinafter AUDITOR REPORT]. 
 7. Id. at 691.  This was not a unanimous vote, according to former board member Julie 
Di Lorenzo (the chair of the Investment and Real Estate Committee). Email from Julie Di 
Lorenzo to Julia Powles, Professor of Law & Tech., Univ. of W. Austl. (May 12, 2019, 6:28 
PM) (on file with authors).  Di Lorenzo voted in dissent, two board members were absent, and 
one board member abstained. Id.; see also Telephone Interview with Julie Di Lorenzo (Apr. 
2019). 
 8. David Rider, Toronto’s High-Tech Quayside District Takes ‘Next Step’ as New Deal 
Reached with Google Sister Company, STAR (July 31, 2018), https://www.thestar.com/ 
news/city_hall/2018/07/31/sidewalk-labs-deal-unlocks-40-million-us-for-quayside-high-
tech-district.html [https://perma.cc/9F2L-QTTM]. 
 9. Brian Barth, The Fight Against Google’s Smart City, WASH. POST (Aug. 8, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2018/08/08/sidewalk-labs/ 
[https://perma.cc/D8WL-S77S]; see also Mariana Valverde & Alexandra Flynn, Mystery on 
the Waterfront:  How the “Smart City” Allure Led a Major Public Agency in Toronto into a 
Reckless Deal with Big Tech, CTR. FOR FREE EXPRESSION (Dec. 3, 2018), 
https://cfe.ryerson.ca/blog/2018/12/mystery-waterfront-how-smart-city-allure-led-major-
public-agency-toronto-reckless-deal [https://perma.cc/XDY5-RZ6J] (Toronto City Councilor 
Denzil Minnan-Wong was the only public official to see the Framework Agreement in his role 
as Waterfront Toronto board member.  He told his fellow councilors at a meeting of the 
council’s executive committee in January 2018, “I know enough about the agreement that I 
think you would like to know more about the agreement [before you approve anything].”). 
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Development Agreement” (PDA), dated July 31, 2018.10  Yet even then, it 
was unclear what this project was all about or what Sidewalk and, more 
broadly, Alphabet’s business model was:  real estate development, 
communications infrastructure, an Android operating system for the city?  It 
was obvious, in the words of Ontario’s auditor general, that the project would 
implicate “intellectual property; data collection, ownership, security and 
privacy; legal issues; consumer protection issues; infrastructure 
development; and economic development,” but Waterfront Toronto was 
charging ahead before any level of government had appropriate public 
policies in place on any of these matters.11 
Wherever the Sidewalk Toronto project lands, and however much of the 
original vision is ever actually implemented, this first stage process of public-
private collaboration reveals how public authorities and technology firms are 
presently positioned in the rush to create the “smart city.”  It also signals what 
happens when the audacious promises and political leverage of one of the 
most powerful companies in the world clash with the efforts of a small, 
expert, and determined band of citizens, journalists, and civic groups. 
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part I is an examination of the first stage 
of the Sidewalk Toronto project, from the issuance of Waterfront Toronto’s 
request for proposals concerning Quayside in March 2017 to the release of 
the “Master Innovation and Development Plan” in spring 2019, and focuses 
on secrecy; the studied ambiguity about land, data, infrastructure; and private 
ordering.  The rollout of Sidewalk Toronto, in important ways, follows other 
Google experiments in other cities and domains.  There is the governmental 
eagerness to ease Google’s entry, the allure of “patient capital” to support 
high-cost investments with long-term payoffs, and the cunning of a company 
with nothing to lose.  Part II examines Sidewalk’s vision of a “digital layer” 
interpenetrating urban life in the context of the developing notion of the “city 
as platform” and analyzes the dangers of platform governance as envisioned 
by Sidewalk’s proposal.  This Article concludes with a summary and 
observations about alternative paths. 
I.  THE MAKING OF SIDEWALK TORONTO 
Waterfront Toronto is a provincial not-for-profit corporation, with all three 
levels of government sharing equal, non-equity shares12 and a limited 
 
 10. See Plan Development Agreement Between Toronto Waterfront Revitalization 
Corporation and Sidewalk Labs LLC, WATERFRONT TORONTO 33 (July 31, 2018), 
https://waterfrontoronto.ca/nbe/wcm/connect/waterfront/73ac1c93-665b-4fb8-b19b-
6bfa23c2a427/PDA+July+31+Fully+Executed+%28002%29.pdf?MOD=AJPERES 
[https://perma.cc/BN55-VVZE] [hereinafter PDA]. 
 11. See AUDITOR REPORT, supra note 6, at 653 (“The Province lacks a policy framework 
to guide the development of a mixed-use smart city such as the one being contemplated for 
Quayside.”). 
 12. CITY OF TORONTO, WATERFRONT STRATEGIC REVIEW 10 (2015), https:// 
www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2015/ex/bgrd/backgroundfile-81763.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
26AU-8KRX] [hereinafter WATERFRONT STRATEGIC REVIEW]; see also CITY OF TORONTO, 
REVIEW OF IMAGINATION, MANUFACTURING, INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGY PROPERTY TAX 
INCENTIVE PROGRAM 5 (2018), https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2018/ex/bgrd/ 
2019] URBANISM UNDER GOOGLE 461 
oversight capacity, which it exercises through the ability to select board 
members, only two of whom may be public officials.13  WT owns most of 
the land on the twelve-acre Quayside site, with the hundreds of acres of 
adjacent waterfront lands mostly owned by the City of Toronto.14 
Leveraging its modest real estate interest and comparatively larger 
redevelopment role, WT announced in the spring of 2017 an audacious vision 
to transform Quayside into a “globally significant demonstration project that 
advances a new market model for climate-positive urban developments”—
“an exemplar of best practices and breakthrough solutions of global 
significance” that it saw as a “pilot environment” and “first step towards the 
longer-term vision for the broader eastern waterfront revitalization.”15  
Whereas WT had previously pursued incremental mixed-use developments, 
it was now pivoting to an ambitious wholesale approach and seeking an 
“innovation” partner as a “co-master developer” to do it.16  By this point, it 
was already in discussions with Alphabet-Sidewalk, whose executives were 
in conversation with Prime Minister Justin Trudeau.17 
A.  The Beginning:  From Request for Proposals to the Framework 
Agreement 
On March 17, 2017, WT issued its request for proposals (RFP) to identify 
a firm to create a “precedent-setting waterfront community” as a “testbed for 
emerging technologies, materials and processes” on Toronto’s eastern 
waterfront.18  It sought a partner to create an “overall vision” and to identify 
the “technologies, infrastructure, strategies, measurable outcomes and 
downstream partners” necessary to ensure the delivery of a “globally 
significant demonstration project” on the Quayside portion of the lands.19  
 
backgroundfile-111606.pdf [https://perma.cc/2LT8-UUXH] [hereinafter TAX INCENTIVE 
REVIEW]. 
 13. Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Corporation Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 28, s. 5(2) 
(Can.) (Established in 2001 as the Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Corporation, WT became 
known by its current name in 2007.). Id. s. 2(1). 
 14. Marco Chown Oved, Google’s Sidewalk Labs Plans Massive Expansion to Waterfront 
Vision, STAR (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2019/02/14/googles-
sidewalk-labs-plans-massive-expansion-to-waterfront-vision.html [https://perma.cc/9VBK-
WLEX] (78 percent of the adjacent land is owned by the city, 11 percent is owned by Ontario, 
and the rest is privately owned.). 
 15. Request for Proposals:  Innovation and Funding Partner for the Quayside 
Development Opportunity, QUAYSIDE 9, 14, 20 (Mar. 17, 2017), https://quaysideto.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2019/04/Waterfront-Toronto-Request-for-Proposals-March-17-2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LV6U-2KBK] [hereinafter RFP]. 
 16. Id. at 17, 30. 
 17. See AUDITOR REPORT, supra note 6, at 688–89, 706–07. 
 18. RFP Released Today to Find Partner for Precedent-Setting Project, WATERFRONT 
TORONTO (Mar. 17, 2017), https://waterfrontoronto.ca/nbe/portal/waterfront/Home/ 
waterfronthome/newsroom/newsarchive/news/2017/march/waterfront-toronto-takes-first-
step-in-building-quayside [https://perma.cc/EB35-UG9Y]. 
 19. See RFP, supra note 15, at 7–9, 14. 
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The RFP involved no guarantees as to volume of work and expressly 
provided that the agreement would not be an exclusive one.20 
Sidewalk Labs LLC describes itself as an “urban innovation firm.”21  Since 
the company’s launch in June 2015,22 it has focused on the research and 
development of pilot initiatives around digital connectivity and data-fueled 
community development, with the most prominent being its advertising-
supported Wi-Fi kiosk gambit on the streets of New York, LinkNYC.23 
Both Sidewalk and WT have roots in failed Olympic bids.  Dan Doctoroff, 
founding CEO of Sidewalk, headed NYC’s bid for the 2012 Olympics.24  WT 
grew out of Toronto’s bid for the 2008 Olympics.25  From Doctoroff’s telling, 
the entities were destined for each other:  Sidewalk was searching the world 
for a place to test its synthesis of digital and physical infrastructure when 
Quayside—and Toronto, “probably the most diverse large city in the 
world”26—came calling.27  For its part, WT was under some pressure to 
accelerate redevelopment after more than a decade of slow, but steady, 
progress.28  It also needed cash; with two decades of tripartite government 
funding coming to an end in 2020/21, the agency’s finances were precarious 
and its ongoing existence under threat.29 
Part of the story in Toronto is a divergence of opinion on the track record 
for waterfront redevelopment and WT’s responsibility therefor.  Doctoroff 
described what he viewed as a century of development failure and a hubristic 
“we alone can fix it” attitude at Sidewalk.30  By contrast, defenders of public 
 
 20. Id. at 28 (“The agreement to be negotiated with the selected Proponent will not be an 
exclusive contract for the provision of the described Partner Scope and Deliverables.  
Waterfront Toronto may contract with others for goods and services the same as or similar to 
the Partner Scope and Deliverables or may obtain such goods and services internally.”). 
 21. Steve Lohr, Sidewalk Labs, a Start-Up Created by Google, Has Bold Aims to Improve 
City Living, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/11/technology/ 
sidewalk-labs-a-start-up-created-by-google-has-bold-aims-to-improve-city-living.html 
[https://perma.cc/5WRT-2BU4]. 
 22. Id. 
 23. See, e.g., Aaron Shapiro, The Urban Stack:  A Topology for Urban Data 
Infrastructures, TECHNOSCIENZA, Feb. 2017, at 61, 66–69. 
 24. Shannon Mattern, Instrumental City:  The View from Hudson Yards, Circa 2019, 
PLACES J. (Apr. 2016), https://placesjournal.org/article/instrumental-city-new-york-hudson-
yards [https://perma.cc/4F34-MY28] (“Of course, data-driven urban planning has a long 
history.”). 
 25. Valverde & Flynn, supra note 9. 
 26. Stephen J. Dubner, How to Build a Smart City, FREAKONOMICS (June 6, 2018, 11:00 
AM), http://freakonomics.com/podcast/dan-doctoroff/ [https://perma.cc/C8LU-S5EW]. 
 27. Daniel L. Doctoroff, Sidewalk’s Role as an “Essential Catalyst,” MEDIUM (Oct. 17, 
2018), https://medium.com/sidewalk-talk/sidewalks-role-as-an-essential-catalyst-
f2c672481872 [https://perma.cc/P67C-Z4SC] (“We had spent significant time searching for a 
place to bring ideas . . . to life, when Waterfront Toronto issued an RFP.”). 
 28. See Valverde & Flynn, supra note 9. 
 29. WATERFRONT STRATEGIC REVIEW, supra note 12, at 11–13 (showing that government 
contributions diminished from C$1.38 billion between 2001 and 2015 to C$123.9 million 
between 2015 and 2025). 
 30. Media Events, Canadian Club—Dan Doctoroff, CEO, Sidewalk Labs, YOUTUBE (Apr. 
16, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nzPYivcQP4M [https://perma.cc/2FRC-
Z5F5] (“For 107 years, [the waterfront] has stubbornly resisted development.”); see also 
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redevelopment identified significant strides (particularly in the commitment 
of substantial public funds to flood protection and environmental 
remediation) that would have been even greater absent austerity measures 
that had starved urban investment over the past several decades.31 
It was in this context that WT received six submissions during the 
unusually short six-week period allotted for RFP responses.32  Acting 
without input from city staff, WT invited three firms to continue on to the 
second stage, at which point Sidewalk was selected.33  In its response, 
Sidewalk proposed projects involving autonomous transit, high-rise 
laminated timber buildings, and underground utility channels,34 and 
Sidewalk also promised to relocate Google’s Canadian headquarters to the 
waterfront.35  A year later, Ontario’s auditor general found that WT chose 
Sidewalk precipitously without adequately consulting the appropriate 
governmental entities.36  WT had first contacted Sidewalk about using 
Quayside as a pilot on June 27, 2016, ten months prior to issuing the RFP.37  
In itself, this might not be concerning as WT seems to have approached a 
number of parties prior to the call.  What distinguishes the Sidewalk contact 
is that it might have originated higher up.  Indeed, Prime Minister Trudeau 
himself hinted at such a possibility, referring at the launch of Sidewalk 
Toronto to the former chairman of Google, stating, “Eric [Schmidt] and I 
have been talking about collaborating on this for a few years now, and seeing 
it all come together is extraordinarily exciting.”38 
WT and Sidewalk entered into a Framework Agreement on October 16, 
2017,39 which seemed to create a limited partnership called Sidewalk 
 
Sidewalk Labs’ Dan Doctoroff:  Quayside and the Future of Cities, RBC DISRUPTERS (Jan. 
17, 2018), https://soundcloud.com/rbcdisruptors/sidewalk-labs-dan-doctoroff-on-the-
quayside-project [https://perma.cc/76Z8-KM6T] (Sidewalk’s approach to Toronto was 
informed by a two-year research project:  “Over the past 50 years . . . 150 or so attempts to 
create smart cities or urban innovation districts . . . .  At some level, every single one of them 
has . . . failed, or never got off the ground.”). 
 31. See Valverde & Flynn, supra note 9. 
 32. See AUDITOR REPORT, supra note 6, at 690. 
 33. See TAX INCENTIVE REVIEW, supra note 12, at 8. 
 34. See id.; see also Peter Carr, Interview with Pamela Robinson on the Sidewalk Toronto 
Waterfront Development and Smart Cities, YOUTUBE (Feb. 12, 2018), https://youtu.be/ 
EKLEbAbOPuU [https://perma.cc/TF8N-EYBX] (describing the document as capturing “the 
greatest hits of urban planning”). 
 35. See Carr, supra note 34. 
 36. See AUDITOR REPORT, supra note 6, at 652 (“The scope of the project, from self-
driving vehicles to data collection, falls under multiple provincial and federal ministries and 
City departments, but Waterfront Toronto did not adequately consult with any of them prior 
to signing an initial agreement on October 16, 2017, and beyond.”). 
 37. See id. at 689, 706. 
 38. Sidewalk Labs, Announcing Sidewalk Toronto:  Press Conference Live Stream, 
YOUTUBE (Oct. 17, 2017), https://youtu.be/A_yg_BsJy_o?t=783 [https://perma.cc/WZF2-
2E45].  It is clear from freedom of information requests that these comments were unscripted.  
At the same event, Eric Schmidt said:  “This is not some random activity from our perspective.  
This is the culmination of, on our side, almost ten years of thinking about how technology 
could improve the quality of people’s lives.” Id. at 43:33. 
 39. Framework Agreement, WATERFRONT TORONTO 1 (Oct. 16, 2017), 
https://www.waterfrontoronto.ca/nbe/wcm/connect/waterfront/035e8ad1-6ba2-46f6-8915-
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Toronto.40  WT released a four-page summary of this agreement on 
November 1, 2017,41 but the parties contracted to keep the full twenty-nine-
page agreement confidential, sharing it with government staff only in a 
limited fashion.42  It is worth noting that both the Framework Agreement and 
Plan Development Agreement refer to several other agreements that have not 
been made public.43 
The secrecy surrounding the Framework Agreement caused significant 
public pushback, as well as criticism from public officials.  A quirk of WT’s 
constitution means that it is not subject to freedom of information requests 
and it can make public only what it wants under a voluntary policy.44  This 
meant that even a freedom of information request on the confidentiality 
provision concerning the Framework Agreement was itself denied.45  So, the 
Framework Agreement was left a riddle wrapped in an enigma.  Such secrecy 
might be unusual for a public authority, but it is not unusual for big tech and 
is a particularly favored strategy of Google.  As of this writing, Google is 
trying to build a new city described as a Google “village” in San Jose, 
California, and has entered into a nondisclosure agreement with the city as it 




 40. Sidewalk Toronto Limited Partnership is registered in British Columbia.  The 
“general” partner is Sidewalk WT Master Developer GP, Ltd. and its mailing address is that 
of Google LLC. See Valverde & Flynn, supra note 9.  There is no record of WT being a limited 
partner with Sidewalk and there is reason to believe that it could not legally be one. Email 
from Mariana Valverde, Professor, Univ. of Toronto, to Ellen P. Goodman (May 12, 2019, 
10:04 PM) (on file with authors). 
 41. Innovation and Funding Partner Framework Agreement Summary of Key Terms for 
Public Disclosure, QUAYSIDE (Nov. 1, 2017), https://quaysideto.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2019/04/Summary-of-Framework-Agreement-November-1-2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5W2H-XN8J] [hereinafter Summary of Framework Agreement].  On the 
same day, and while due diligence was still underway, the WT and Sidewalk CEOs coauthored 
an opinion piece. See Daniel L. Doctoroff & Will Fleissig, Opinion, ‘The Neighbourhood of 
the Future Starts with Your Ideas,’ STAR (Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.thestar.com/opinion/ 
commentary/2017/11/01/the-neighbourhood-of-the-future-starts-with-your-ideas.html 
[https://perma.cc/K7PB-9RJT]. 
 42. Executive Committee Consideration on January 24, 2018, CITY TORONTO, 
http://app.toronto.ca/tmmis/viewAgendaItemHistory.do?item=2018.EX30.9 
[https://perma.cc/2ZYR-Z48A] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019). 
 43. See Framework Agreement, supra note 39, § 15 (referring to the “Initial Definitive 
Documents,” including the “Development Plan Budget” and the “Land Methodology”).  There 
are also various references to “Implementation Agreements,” as well as to “Business and 
Implementation Plans.” See id. 
 44. See Accountability Policies, WATERFRONT TORONTO, 
http://www.waterfrontoronto.ca/nbe/portal/waterfront/Home/waterfronthome/about-
us/accountability/policies [https://perma.cc/9KFF-XJ2Q] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019). 
 45. Bernard Rudny, Civic Tech:  We Tried to Get a Copy of the Sidewalk Toronto 
Agreement, TORONTOIST (Apr. 12, 2018), https://torontoist.com/2018/04/civic-tech-tried-get-
copy-sidewalk-toronto-agreement-heres-happened/ [https://perma.cc/PP6J-TPMT]. 
 46. Jennifer Wadsworth, Lawsuit Targets Secrecy Agreements Linked to Google’s 
Planned San Jose Campus, SAN JOSE INSIDE (Nov. 13, 2018), http://www.sanjoseinside.com/ 
2018/11/13/lawsuit-targets-secrecy-agreements-linked-to-googles-planned-san-jose-campus/ 
[https://perma.cc/78YG-HR2R]. 
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transparency.47  As in Toronto, the details of how development will happen 
and what the costs and benefits will be are unknown.  The San Jose City 
Council went ahead and approved the sale.48 
The Quayside Framework Agreement was an agreement to agree on a 
detailed overall master plan—the much referenced, but minimally 
elaborated, “Master Innovation and Development Plan” (MIDP).49  
Ultimately, MIDP implementation would require necessary approvals and 
actions from the City of Toronto, including “planning, building and 
environmental approvals, right-of-way permits, road closings, real-estate 
transactions, and affordable housing requirements.”50  Sidewalk agreed to 
provide funding of up to C$10 million for plan development and pilot 
projects prior to the achievement of certain “initial plan milestones” and 
another C$40 million after.51  The Framework Agreement makes clear that 
Sidewalk wears four hats:  land developer, urban planner, technology 
specialist, and services vendor.52  This paper does not address the land 
development portion, except to note that the Framework Agreement neither 
assured Sidewalk of any land development rights nor precluded them in the 
future.53  There was, however, a clear connection between the land and 
Sidewalk:  the company’s continued involvement depended on a public 
contribution of C$1.25 billion in order for WT to complete a major flood 
protection project across the Port Lands, which would make the land viable 
for redevelopment.54  Full flood protection was accomplished in May 2018.55  
It was not clearly apparent that Sidewalk’s plan was a “real-estate play” until 
many months after the release of the Framework Agreement,56 when 
Sidewalk’s internal discussions were leaked to the press.57 
 
 47. Id. 
 48. Roland Li, San Jose Approves Google Land Deal:  Police Remove Protesters as 
Council Closes Chambers, S.F. CHRON. (Dec. 5, 2018), https://www.sfchronicle.com/ 
business/article/Google-s-San-Jose-land-deal-vote-Police-remove-13443835.php 
[https://perma.cc/F62Q-7HWH]. 
 49. See generally Framework Agreement, supra note 39 (referencing MIDP throughout 
the document). 
 50. See TAX INCENTIVE REVIEW, supra note 12, at 2. 
 51. Id. at 19. 
 52. See Framework Agreement, supra note 39, §§ 11–15 (outlining the objectives, roles, 
and responsibilities). 
 53. See id. § 25 (“For the avoidance of doubt, [WT] shall not be obligated to transfer any 
land to the Master Developer prior to the approval of the MIDP.”). 
 54. See AUDITOR REPORT, supra note 6, at 649. 
 55. Id. at 651. 
 56. Though the company retreated from this position, Dan Doctoroff was quoted in the 
deal’s first coverage as saying that it “primarily is a real-estate play.” Alex Bozikovic, 
Google’s Sidewalk Labs Signs Deal for ‘Smart City’ Makeover of Toronto’s Waterfront, 
GLOBE & MAIL (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/toronto/google-
sidewalk-toronto-waterfront/article36612387/ [https://perma.cc/8S8A-QWH8]. 
 57. See infra Part I.C. 
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B.  Public Outrage:  Between the Framework Agreement and the Plan 
Development Agreement 
In the nine-and-a-half-month period following the announcement of the 
Sidewalk Toronto project, members of the public and public officials 
expressed concerns about data, secrecy, scope, the corporate role in planning, 
and the absence of public accountability.  No one could figure out what 
Sidewalk’s business plan was, how it would make money, how it would pay 
for the ambitious innovations it proposed, and what long-term commitments 
it was prepared to make to the city.  Even the question of Sidewalk’s 
ownership or role in managing real estate was ambiguous. 
Sidewalk executed a remarkably effective public relations campaign, 
heralding its hope to “bend the curve on quality of life,” particularly around 
affordability and sustainability.58  A major source of public concern was that 
a steward of public lands was creating public policy with, and via, a private 
vendor.59  Sidewalk ran “public roundtables” as citizen engagement events 
with the flavor, but not the actual accountability, of public hearings.60  Citing 
this and other aspects of Sidewalk’s public relations work, which accounted 
for a sizeable portion of the C$50 million the company contributed to the 
project,61 the Canadian Civil Liberties Association called the whole process 
one of “governance by mercenary.”62 
At every stage, ambiguity, secrecy, and slipperiness have dogged the 
Sidewalk Toronto project.  Because Sidewalk is a Google-affiliated 
company, data issues were always going to be front and center.  Experts 
immediately worried about surveillance.63  At first, Sidewalk handled issues 
of data collection, data control, and privacy by offering up general and vague 
 
 58. See, e.g., Dubner, supra note 26. 
 59. Bianca Wylie, Google Is Still Planning a ‘Smart City’ in Toronto Despite Major 
Privacy Concerns, VICE (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/xwkv9z/google-
planning-smart-city-toronto-despite-privacy-concerns [https://perma.cc/M2AU-7HPJ] 
(“Waterfront Toronto is . . . a public corporation making policy with a vendor.”). 
 60. Id.; see also AUDITOR REPORT, supra note 6, at 707–08. 
 61. Bianca Wylie, Debrief on Sidewalk Toronto Public Meeting #3—A Master Class in 
Gaslighting and Arrogance, MEDIUM (Aug. 19, 2018), https://medium.com/@biancawylie/ 
debrief-on-sidewalk-toronto-public-meeting-3-a-master-class-in-gaslighting-and-arrogance-
c1c5dd918c16 [https://perma.cc/V4B5-C6V8] (The PDA budgets “more than $11 million 
USD” for “communications, external affairs and engagement . . . .  This program will ‘seek to 
ensure support for the master innovation and development plan among key constituents in 
Toronto.’ . . .  The residents’ reference panel is being paid for and run by a corporation.  That’s 
called a focus group.” (quoting PDA, supra note 10, at 34)). 
 62. Governing by Mercenary, CANADIAN C.L. ASS’N (Jan. 29, 2019), https://ccla.org/ 
governing-by-mercenary/ [https://perma.cc/CY9K-5TC9]. 
 63. See, e.g., Jim Balsillie, Sidewalk Toronto Has Only One Beneficiary, and It Is Not 
Toronto, GLOBE & MAIL (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-
sidewalk-toronto-is-not-a-smart-city/ [https://perma.cc/2T24-TFH2]; Andrew Clement, 
Sidewalk Labs’ Toronto Waterfront Tech Hub Must Respect Privacy, Democracy, STAR (Jan. 
12, 2018), https://www.thestar.com/opinion/contributors/2018/01/12/sidewalk-labs-toronto-
waterfront-tech-hub-must-respect-privacy-democracy.html [https://perma.cc/T3RU-2ZGD]. 
2019] URBANISM UNDER GOOGLE 467 
principles (e.g., privacy by design, accountability, community benefit).64  It 
also made a particularly savvy hire, the former Information and Privacy 
Commissioner of Ontario Ann Cavoukian, whom it had retained along with 
other prominent privacy professionals to help it develop privacy and data use 
policies.  The summary of the Framework Agreement said that the parties 
“plan to continue to develop a thoughtful ‘Privacy by Design’ policy”—a 
reference to the design framework for which Cavoukian is best known, but 
there were no details.65  Nothing about privacy or data appeared in the 
Framework Agreement itself.  It took seven months, or until May 2018, 
before a high-level statement of guiding principles for data use emerged.  
Somewhat ironically, given the controversy over the project’s secrecy, 
principles of transparency, proactive engagement, and community trust were 
chief among them.66 
Lead critics swiftly connected concerns over data to concerns over 
governance and to a fundamental challenge to autonomy and freedom in 
urban space.  Bianca Wylie, cofounder of the technology advocacy group 
Tech Reset Canada, quickly became an authority, reporting comprehensively 
and expertly on the spawning project.67  Testifying before the Toronto City 
Council in January 2018, she argued that “the biggest issue is not privacy, 
it’s governance.”68  Wylie argued that we need to think about the “data 
infrastructure the way we think about critical physical infrastructure.  It 
cannot be proprietary.”69  Following this meeting, the executive committee 
of the council referred a request to the director of the Waterfront Secretariat, 
requesting that WT “[i]nvestigate the feasibility of establishing a 
democratically representative residents’ advisory group with a fiduciary 
responsibility to look after residents’ digital interests” and to have the goal 
that “[a]ll data collection should be anonymous by default”70—two elements 
that, at least before the release of the MIDP, did not further materialize.  
There was a growing recognition that the initial framing of the project had 
sidelined the question of first principles:  should people be tracked in the 
 
 64. Our Approach to Data Privacy, SIDEWALK LABS, https://storage.googleapis.com 
/sidewalk-toronto-ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/13214336/Sidewalk-Labs-Approach-to-
Privacy.pdf [https://perma.cc/LS78-62N8] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019). 
 65. See Summary of Framework Agreement, supra note 41, at 2. 




 67. See, e.g., Bianca Wylie, Smart Cities Need Smart Governance, GLOBE & MAIL (Dec. 
5, 2017), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/smart-communities-need-smart-
governance/article37218398/ [https://perma.cc/6CCJ-JC5S]; see also Laura Bliss, Meet the 
Jane Jacobs of the Smart Cities Age, CITYLAB (Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.citylab.com/ 
life/2018/12/bianca-wylie-interview-toronto-quayside-protest-criticism/574477/ 
[https://perma.cc/BAH6-4J9W]. 
 68. Bianca Wylie, My Deputation to Toronto’s Executive Committee on Sidewalk 
Toronto, MEDIUM (Jan. 25, 2018), https://medium.com/@biancawylie/my-deputation-to-
torontos-executive-committee-on-sidewalk-toronto-jan-24-2018-ee25785bc44e 
[https://perma.cc/6ZZN-HQXE]. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See Executive Committee Consideration on January 24, 2018, supra note 42. 
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public realm in the first place, and who should benefit?  As Wylie put it, 
“[w]hen did we as a society say that however we move around in public 
space—that this is something we want to share and commodify?”71 
A second aspect of studied ambiguity in the rollout of Sidewalk Toronto 
was the most basic issue of scope:  the categorical difference between the 
twelve-acre Quayside plot and the 880-acre eastern waterfront, 
encompassing the Port Lands and surrounding area.  In its RFP, WT scoped 
the project to the Quayside site but also framed the project as a pilot for 
revitalization of the broader eastern waterfront.72  The summary of the 
Framework Agreement stated that both Quayside and the eastern waterfront 
would be included in planning for the MIDP.73  A report prepared for the city 
council, by contrast, stated confidently that the MIDP “will address the 12-
acre Quayside site” and that “[i]t is premature for City Council to be making 
decisions about implementation related to the redevelopment of the Port 
Lands.”74  The apparent tension between the summary document and the 
city’s position created confusion; well into the project, “senior city officials 
were still expressing concerns” that WT was working with Sidewalk on the 
Port Lands when the officials thought the scope should be more limited.75  
The ambiguity about land fed an anxiety that public assets were being sold 
short on the promises of a gleaming new city of the future.76  Sidewalk’s 
investment of US$50 million began to look a little less generous once the 
public had invested C$1.25 billion to ready the Port Lands for 
development.77  WT’s own limited financing at the time of the RFP award 
and its need to secure ongoing funds made Sidewalk’s contribution seem 
larger than it was in comparison to what the public was contributing.  
 
 71. Chris Rattan, Torontonians Should Take Control of Their Data, NOW TORONTO (May 
23, 2018, 5:29 PM), https://nowtoronto.com/news/owns-data-toronto-smart-city/ [https:// 
perma.cc/L7A7-JE39]. 
 72. See RFP, supra note 15, at 6 (“[I]t may be beneficial to advance the solutions, 
processes and partnerships proven successful through the Project to subsequent developments 
on the eastern waterfront.”); see also Summary of Framework Agreement, supra note 41, at 4 
(including visualizations). 
 73. See Summary of Framework Agreement, supra note 41, at 1. 
 74. See TAX INCENTIVE REVIEW, supra note 12, at 2. 
 75. Jeff Gray & Josh O’Kane, Waterfront Toronto, Sidewalk Labs Walk Back Plans in 
New Deal, GLOBE & MAIL (July 31, 2018), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/ 
canada/toronto/article-new-deal-between-waterfront-toronto-and-sidewalk-labs-walks-back-
some/ [https://perma.cc/Y88L-ZGM9] (describing a letter from interim City Manager 
Giuliana Carbone to Waterfront Toronto calling for “more clarity around the city’s role in 
approving any use of its land” and seeking an explicit statement that the project was for 
Quayside only). 
 76. Jamie Powell, Sidewalk Toronto:  Delays and NDAs, FIN. TIMES:  ALPHAVILLE (July 
2, 2018), https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2018/07/02/1530507600000/Sidewalk-Toronto--delays-
and-NDAs/ [https://perma.cc/37PJ-FYDF] (“[T]he opportunity cost of leaving the waterfront 
site undeveloped until Google-fication is rolled out en masse theoretically totals billions of 
Canadian dollars.”). 
 77. Memorandum from Serge Dupont to the Prime Minister of Can. (Feb. 21, 2017) (on 
file with authors) (“WT has indicated that it will be difficult to get a technology partner with 
deep pockets to commit to their smart city vision without a commitment by governments to 
fund the [Port Lands Flood Protection Project], which would provide a valuable location for 
the partner to scale up.”). 
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Sidewalk’s messaging about the economic value of Quayside suggested that 
the unimproved land was not worth all that much.  While its book value for 
WT was only about C$40 million, the actual value was more than ten times 
this amount because the land had already been rezoned for the more desirable 
mixed-use development.78  This discrepancy only added to the sense that the 
project was moving too fast and returning to the public much less than full 
value. 
Over the summer of 2018, the Sidewalk Toronto project was not 
proceeding smoothly.  WT’s CEO Will Fleissig resigned,79 forced out under 
pressure from the board.80  Several weeks later, and for entirely different 
reasons, one of WT’s most prominent and experienced board members—real 
estate developer Julie Di Lorenzo—resigned, claiming that contractual 
provisions with Sidewalk (effectively requiring consensus positioning 
between WT and Sidewalk) prevented her from exercising her fiduciary 
duties over a project that had disappointed her from its commencement.81  
She expressed dismay that Sidewalk had become WT’s “filter . . . gatekeeper 
and . . . agent,” that it was being permitted to operate outside of the agency’s 
procurement protocol, and that numerous questions about digital governance 
and privacy remained unanswered.82  The Plan Development Agreement was 
signed immediately after Di Lorenzo’s resignation.83  In addition, there were 
resignations from the new Digital Strategy Advisory Panel that WT had set 
up to advise on data issues, citing concerns about the lack of transparency, 
integrity, and trust in the process and parties involved.84 
C.  Emerging Scope:  Between the Plan Development Agreement and the 
Master Innovation and Development Plan 
On July 31, 2018, the Plan Development Agreement85 between WT and 
Sidewalk replaced the Framework Agreement, which was finally made 
 
 78. Mariana Valverde, Public Lands, Private Control, and Housing Needs in the ‘Smart 
City’ Quayside Development, CTR. FOR FREE EXPRESSION (Dec. 4, 2018), https:// 
cfe.ryerson.ca/blog/2018/12/public-lands-private-control-and-housing-needs-smart-city-
quayside-development [https://perma.cc/P4LH-PE2Q] (noting that Quayside “as it is already 
zoned” is estimated to be worth “$500 to $600 million”). 
 79. Inori Roy, Waterfront Toronto CEO Will Fleissig to Step Down, STAR (July 4, 2018), 
https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2018/07/04/waterfront-toronto-ceo-will-fleissig-to-step-
down.html [https://perma.cc/V54G-5Q7W]. 
 80. Amanda Roth, Fleissig, CEO of Waterfront Toronto, Pressured Out by Board, LOGIC 
(July 6, 2018), https://thelogic.co/news/exclusive/fleissig-ceo-of-waterfront-toronto-
pressured-out-by-board/ [https://perma.cc/D9T4-6WHP]. 
 81. David Rider, Waterfront Toronto Deal with Google Sister Company Is 
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 84. Milan Gokhale, Towards a More Equitable Sidewalk Toronto, CTR. FOR FREE 
EXPRESSION (Oct. 27, 2018), https://cfe.ryerson.ca/key-resources/commentary/towards-more-
equitable-sidewalk-toronto [https://perma.cc/DF6W-F6K8]. 
 85. See generally PDA, supra note 10. 
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public on the same day it became defunct.  The published texts—of both the 
new and old agreements—offered for the first time some clarity on scope.  In 
terms of land, the full text of the Framework Agreement revealed that the 
parties wanted the “solutions, processes and partnerships” developed at 
Quayside to be applied “to subsequent developments on the Eastern 
Waterfront, as those lands become available.”86  Further, an express part of 
the work plan included “a process for the transfer and valuation of land for 
purposes of implementation of the MIDP.”87  The PDA continued this theme, 
stating that the MIDP “will include both plans for the Quayside Parcel and 
plans at scale, including for the [eastern waterfront],” and acknowledging 
that this could extend to “lands not owned or controlled by the Parties.”88 
The clearest expression of scope appears in the exclusivity provisions of 
each agreement.  Both the Framework Agreement and the PDA prohibited 
WT from investigating any other development of the entire eastern 
waterfront during the term of each respective agreement, i.e., until the MIDP 
was approved or the parties terminated the agreement.89  This period was 
envisaged in the PDA to extend to December 31, 2019, and potentially 
further,90 i.e., well over two years after Sidewalk won the RFP.  This was—
despite the unambiguous provision in the RFP stating that WT would not be 
entering into an exclusivity arrangement with its innovation and funding 
partner91—a total change in position that accounts, perhaps, for some of the 
parties’ confounding secrecy surrounding the agreements. 
Three schedules of the PDA are of particular note:  procurement, 
intellectual property (IP), and digital governance.  One of the Framework 
Agreement’s milestones for continued collaboration between Sidewalk and 
WT had been agreement on “fair and arms’-length procurement standards” 
on the site.92  The procurement schedule established that Sidewalk would 
control procurement before implementation of the MIDP at its option using 
competitive procedures or sole sourcing.93  After implementation, 
procurement standards would “seek to balance—in the public interest—the 
use of market-based sourcing, on the one hand, and the direct facilitation of 
Purposeful Solutions [technological innovations with no suitable market 
alternatives] for innovation.”94  In other words, the PDA envisaged that 
 
 86. See Framework Agreement, supra note 39, § 8. 
 87. Id. § 15. 
 88. See PDA, supra note 10, at 32. 
 89. See Framework Agreement, supra note 39, § 45; see also PDA, supra note 10, at 15. 
 90. See PDA, supra note 10, at 14.  A July 2019 amendment to the PDA replaced the date 
“December 31, 2019,” with “December 31, 2020.” See Amending Agreement, WATERFRONT 
TORONTO (July 31, 2019), https://waterfrontoronto.ca/nbe/wcm/connect/waterfront/ 
73ac1c93-665b-4fb8-b19b-6bfa23c2a427/PDA+July+31+Fully+Executed+%28002%29.pdf 
?MOD=AJPERES [https://perma.cc/BN55-VVZE]. 
 91. RFP, supra note 15, at 28. 
 92. See PDA, supra note 10, at 36. 
 93. Id. (stating that Sidewalk “may provide for competitive procurement (including an 
invitational process soliciting bids from a set of qualified bidders) in appropriate 
circumstances and may provide for sole sourcing in appropriate circumstances”). 
 94. Id. 
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development of the site would be a mix of competitive procurement and sole 
sourcing.  What this means in practice is that Sidewalk, as the technology 
partner, would be in a position to create technology procurement needs for 
which it or another Alphabet-Google company would be a “Purposeful 
Solution” or a sole-source provider.  Again, this is anomalous for WT, given 
the authority’s statement that, “[s]ince inception, our funding agreements 
with our government partners have prohibited us from sole sourcing any 
contract more than $75,000.”95 
Moving to intellectual property, the intellectual property schedule 
addresses how the benefits of innovation connected to the project will be 
distributed between the parties.  Here too, Sidewalk seems to be walking 
away with a sweet deal.  The PDA is ambiguous about just who will own the 
data and insights generated by the Sidewalk Toronto project.  The definition 
clause identifies that various types of intellectual property will be part of the 
project, including copyright material, IP in various products and services, 
potential patentable inventions, and brands.  It also states that “[o]ther types 
of Intellectual Property may arise in the course of the MIDP, including 
data.”96  This is followed by a clause substantially similar to what Google 
affiliates have used before with public partners.97  In setting out what is 
described as the “IP-related value drivers” brought by each partner to the 
project, the PDA notes that Sidewalk brings “its experiences and learnings 
accumulated in other markets” (limited, of course, given its youth).98  WT 
brings something rather more tangible:  first, “a meaningful test bed and 
product/service trial venue at the MIDP Site” and second, “responsible 
access to datasets necessary or useful to the design or prototyping of 
Products and Services.”99  Strikingly, only the test bed is recognized as a 
compensable contribution, with the goal being to ensure that the public is 
“reasonably compensated” for the opportunities provided by the test bed.100  
By contrast, there is a notable silence about any compensation for access to 
datasets.  This detail is a key plank of Sidewalk’s data strategy and an 
important foundation for future developments.  The short shrift given to WT-
furnished data contrasts with the express recognition that Sidewalk will have 
exclusive ownership of any IP that is generated on the site and not specified 
or required by the deal—what is termed in the agreement “Non-MIDP Site 
IP.”101 
The data questions become more interesting in connection with the 
schedule on digital governance, which sets out seven guiding digital design 
 
 95. Awarded Contracts, WATERFRONT TORONTO, https://waterfrontoronto.ca/nbe/wcm/ 
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 96. See PDA, supra note 10, at 41. 
 97. Julia Powles & Hal Hodson, Google DeepMind and Healthcare in an Age of 
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 98. See PDA, supra note 10, at 41. 
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principles—high-level aspirations for the collection and use of data in the 
project, which incorporate many best practices.  The language is ambitious 
and borders on hyperbole.  For example, one of the principles is to “create 
the most privacy protected/citizen-centered set of policies and governance 
structures in the world.”102  Another, picking up a trend from Europe, is to 
“[e]xplore novel forms of data governance, such as . . . an independent data 
trust with representation by both data subjects and citizens more 
generally.”103  The principles also envisage 
[n]ovel ownership structures for non-personal data, and associated open 
protocols and rules, to ensure public policy objectives are met, including 
access by and potential ownership of data by Waterfront Toronto, the City 
of Toronto, Province of Ontario or Government of Canada or other such 
third parties as deemed appropriate by the Parties.104 
It is not clear how this schedule interacts overall with the provisions just 
outlined in the intellectual property schedule, but the PDA does provide that 
“[d]ata ownership will be addressed in greater detail through the MIDP.105 
Some months after the release of the PDA, and one full year after the RFP 
was awarded, Sidewalk elaborated on its data governance vision with what it 
called a “Civic Data Trust” for the Sidewalk Toronto project.106  Under the 
proposal, all data collected for the first time (or, we might say, “natively”) in 
the physical space of the MIDP site would be classed as “Urban Data,” and 
all access to, and use of, this data would be mediated by the Civic Data Trust, 
which would treat all applications—from Sidewalk or anyone else—on the 
same terms.107  In passing, the proposal distinguishes data collected through 
websites or mobile phones but does not expressly exclude or limit those 
sources if they are designed by Sidewalk or otherwise collecting native or 
original data.108 
Using the mechanism of a trust, what Sidewalk really seemed to be 
proposing was to unilaterally redefine all data collected within the MIDP site 
as Urban Data—from public spaces and from private ones, including 
apartments, homes, and offices “not controlled by those who occupy them” 
 
 102. Id. at 47–48. 
 103. See id. at 47 (“The trust could carry a fiduciary responsibility to serve and balance 
data subject and public interest within a framework that treats privacy from both a public as 
well as a private good perspective.”). 
 104. Id. at 48. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See generally Sidewalk Labs, Digital Governance Proposals for DSAP Consultation, 




 107. Id. at 8, 37; see also Alyssa Harvey Dawson, An Update on Data Governance for 
Sidewalk Toronto, MEDIUM (Oct. 16, 2018), https://medium.com/sidewalk-talk/an-update-on-
data-governance-for-sidewalk-toronto-d810245f10f7 [https://perma.cc/RQ2M-FM5R]. 
 108. See Sidewalk Labs, supra note 106, at 14 (“Urban Data is anchored to geography, 
unlike data collected through websites and mobile phones, and lends itself to local 
governance.”). 
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(i.e., including any leased space or anywhere offered “as a service”).109  This 
sleight of hand, creating a term unrecognized in law, would effectively negate 
any default privacy setting:  everything done within the bounds of the 
Sidewalk Toronto project would be potentially up for grabs.110  Sean 
McDonald warned, “proposing that Toronto should base ownership 
determinations on the urbanity of a data set is a departure from Canadian data 
ownership law and a precedent that, if approved, could extend far beyond 
this project.”111  Sidewalk recommended that Urban Data should be “de-
identified” by default, presumably by those collecting the data.112  It also 
offered platitudes that the trust mechanism “would be on top of—not in place 
of—existing law, regulation, and government enforcement.”113  For all that, 
it is notable that the trust mechanism envisaged no limits on data collection 
or use, nor did it ensure that there would be surveillance-free zones.114  De-
identification is a flea on the back of the elephant of data collection.  Further, 
and radically, the proposal takes the position that all de-identified data 
(notwithstanding the problems associated with that concept) should be “open, 
free, and available” by default—under a self-certification scheme that 
involves no substantive review.115  This is the flea goading the elephant on a 
rampage. 
Experts question whether the trust has any basis in Canadian law,116 and 
though it was proposed to ameliorate Sidewalk’s monopolization of data, the 
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‘urban’ data as a unique category, which is then treated differently—here, ‘urban’ data would 
be declared a ‘public asset,’ and then published. . . .  Proposing quasi-nationalization of data 
is a big deal . . . .”). 
 111. Id. 
 112. See Sidewalk Labs, supra note 106, at 9. 
 113. Id. at 13. 
 114. See danah boyd & Kate Crawford, Critical Questions for Big Data, 15 INFO. COMM. 
& SOC’Y 662, 662–79 (2012). 
 115. See Sidewalk Labs, supra note 106, at 13, 15, 16. 
 116. Trusts under Canadian law are ways to manage assets that are owned for the benefit 
of specific beneficiaries.  Who owns the data that is contributed to the data trust?  Since trust 
owners designate beneficiaries, who would Sidewalk and other platform companies 
designate? See Mariana Valverde, What Is a Data Trust and Why Are We Even Talking About 
It?:  Sidewalk Labs’ Magic Tricks, CTR. FOR FREE EXPRESSION (Jan. 14, 2019), https:// 
cfe.ryerson.ca/blog/2019/01/what-data-trust-and-why-are-we-even-talking-about-it-
sidewalk-labs’-magic-tricks [https://perma.cc/9QJJ-59A5] (“[D]e-identifying data doesn’t 
make it public, it just steers commercialization into certain channels; and making privately 
owned data sets available doesn’t make them publicly owned.”); see also TORONTO REGION 
BD. OF TRADE, BIBLIOTECH:  BEYOND QUAYSIDE;  A CITY-BUILDING PROPOSAL FOR THE 
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proposal provided no defense against the company effectively enclosing the 
benefits of a data commons using a dominant position in data collection and 
analytics.117  One of the characteristics of vendor-made policy is that it need 
not tie in with other governmental efforts.  So here, it is unclear how a data 
trust into which all public data is deposited fits in with Toronto’s existing 
Open Data Master Plan,118 for example, or the work that Ontario and Canada 
are undertaking on comprehensive data laws. 
Even more fundamentally, the trust proposal distracts from the first-order 
questions.  Of these, the very first is:  why is a vendor making policy?  Next, 
asked an observer, “why are we collecting any data at all?”119  And finally, 
what happened to privacy by design?  Within four days of the announcement 
of the Civic Data Trust, Sidewalk’s most prominent privacy defender, Ann 
Cavoukian, resigned because she said Sidewalk had reneged on its promise 
that all data would be de-identified at the source.120  Her departure over such 
a basic feature of data flows, fully one year into the project, showed just how 
undeveloped or at least undisclosed the data policies were.121 
The capstone to the interregnum between the PDA and MIDP releases was 
the accidental revelation, finally, of Sidewalk’s business plan.  Investigative 
news reports broke on February 14, 2019, six months after release of the 
PDA, that Sidewalk had been meeting regularly with government officials to 
preview its real estate play in the Port Lands.122  It proposed to finance rail 
infrastructure on the eastern waterfront in return for a cut of property taxes,123 
arguing that it is “entitled to . . . a share in the uptick in land value on the 
entire geography . . . [and] a share of developer charges and incremental tax 
revenue on all land.”124  Sidewalk’s ambition for scale had been apparent, 
 
TORONTO PUBLIC LIBRARY TO ESTABLISH A CIVIC DATA HUB (2019), https://www.bot.com/ 
Portals/0/Bibliotech%20-%20Final%20-%20Jan%208.pdf [https://perma.cc/DT28-3KW9] 
(proposing that governance of Quayside data be moved to the public library). 
 117. See generally JOSE VAN DIJCK, THOMAS POELL & MARTIJN DE WAAL, THE PLATFORM 
SOCIETY:  PUBLIC VALUES IN A CONNECTIVE WORLD 154–55 (2018); ROB KITCHIN, THE DATA 
REVOLUTION:  BIG DATA, OPEN DATA, DATA INFRASTRUCTURES AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES 
(2014). 
 118. Open Data Master Plan, CITY TORONTO, https://www.toronto.ca/city-government/ 
data-research-maps/open-data/open-data-master-plan/ [https://perma.cc/2YDZ-WSDL] (last 
visited Oct. 6, 2019). 
 119. Gokhale, supra note 84. 
 120. Sean O’Shea, Ann Cavoukian, Former Ontario Privacy Commissioner, Resigns from 
Sidewalk Labs, GLOBAL NEWS (Oct. 22, 2018), https://globalnews.ca/news/4579265/ann-
cavoukian-resigns-sidewalk-labs/ [https://perma.cc/RYN7-4GJB]. 
 121. Laura Bliss, How Smart Should a City Be?:  Toronto Is Finding Out, CITYLAB (Sept. 
7, 2018), https://www.citylab.com/design/2018/09/how-smart-should-a-city-be-toronto-is-
finding-out/569116/ [https://perma.cc/487S-TDCM] (“Sidewalk Labs has provided little 
information during the public engagement process about how data gathered at Quayside would 
be owned and used.”). 
 122. Oved, supra note 14. 
 123. Id.; see also Framework Agreement, supra note 39, § 34 (In anticipation this strategy, 
“[t]he parties will explore financing mechanisms that monetize the future economic impacts 
(including through adjustments in tax assessments and other public fees) to sponsor 
infrastructure.”). 
 124. Oved, supra note 14. 
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but oblique.125  Within the space of a year and with no public engagement, 
Sidewalk had seemingly abandoned its reassurances that the scope of the 
project was modest and “additive,”126 that it would proceed slowly from 
proven testing, piloting, and stakeholder engagement at Quayside, and that 
“geography can be a discussion after the plan is finished.”127  The news that 
February morning revealed something far more audacious:  Sidewalk CEO 
Dan Doctoroff’s assertion that “if there is no light rail through the project, 
then the project is not interesting to us”128 and the plan for the never-
previously discussed Villiers Island to house a thirty-four-to-forty-six-acre 
Google development.129  Meanwhile, on Toronto’s information page on 
“Current Projects” for the Waterfront Secretariat, the Sidewalk Toronto 
project continued to be referred to as restricted to Quayside, to twelve-acres, 
and to a carefully bound scope,130 with no mention of the entire site. 
To recap what we learned during the first eighteen months of the Sidewalk 
Toronto project: 
(1) A public authority partnered with a big tech company to scope out a 
new urban district.  The initial terms of the collaboration were kept secret 
from the public and public officials for nine-and-a-half months.  The terms 
of the evolving MIDP, which will ultimately govern the project, were secret 
for at least eighteen months. 
(2) The process for public engagement was staged and managed by the 
company, with the public as well as relevant public officials kept out of key 
consultations. 
(3) During the working out of plan details, the public invested C$1.25 
billion on real property improvements, while at the same time the public 
 
 125. See Media Events, supra note 27; see also Dan Doctoroff, Sidewalk Toronto Project 
Update, MEDIUM (Feb. 14, 2019), https://medium.com/sidewalk-toronto/sidewalk-toronto-
project-update-d44738cdb239 [https://perma.cc/V8AW-3EAB] (“[M]uch of what’s possible 
is only viable when different aspects of the project — particularly related to infrastructure —
 incorporate portions of the Eastern Waterfront.”). 
 126. Sidewalk Toronto, Neighbourhood Meeting with the West Don Lands Committee, 
QUAYSIDE 2 (Feb. 26, 2018), https://quaysideto.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/West-Don-
Lands-Committee-Summary-Notes-February-26-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/C2HM-9P8F] 
(“Quayside is a start of ideas . . . .  We’re here to be additive.”). 
 127. Sidewalk Toronto, Neighbourhood Meeting with the Corktown Residents and 
Business Association, QUAYSIDE (June 5, 2018), https://quaysideto.ca/wp-content/uploads/ 
2019/04/Corktown-Residents-and-Business-Association-Meeting-Summary-Notes-June-5-
2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/36MV-7CDZ] (“We don’t pre-suppose how interested the City is 
in all this. . . .  If the testing or piloting works on Quayside, then the Port Lands could be 
another opportunity to advance towards.  But it’s important not to pre-suppose and say would 
could happen. . . .  Nothing is committed at this time.”). 
 128. Tara Deschamps, Sidewalk Labs May Lose Interest in Quayside Project If Transit Isn’t 
Built, CEO Says, FIN. POST (Mar. 7, 2019), https://business.financialpost.com/pmn/business-
pmn/sidewalk-labs-could-pull-out-of-quayside-project-if-transit-isnt-built-ceo-says 
[https://perma.cc/Q544-X6GQ]. 
 129. See Doctoroff, supra note 125; Project Update, SIDEWALK TORONTO 10 (Feb. 14, 
2019), https://storage.googleapis.com/sidewalk-toronto-ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/ 
13210348/FEB14-SWTO-Business-Case-Overview.pdf [https://perma.cc/VZ4K-D3FZ]. 
 130. Quayside, CITY TORONTO, https://www.toronto.ca/city-government/planning-
development/waterfront/initiatives/current-projects/quayside/ [https://perma.cc/SND7-6H44] 
(last visited Oct. 6, 2019). 
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authority was contractually precluded from considering other developers, 
despite it having solicited proposals on the express condition that the 
agreement was nonexclusive. 
(4) Within the geographic bounds of the project, which pivoted from a 
mere twelve-acres to a sprawling 880-acres, the tech company unilaterally 
redefined all data collected natively from the site as “Urban Data,” subject to 
rule by a poorly defined Civic Data Trust. 
(5) Numerous resignations of high-profile advisors to the project and 
public opposition did not slow down the process or cause a rethinking of the 
whole approach, which moved on despite there being inadequate policies in 
place to deal with data governance, procurement, intellectual property, and 
many other fundamental aspects of the project. 
II.  SIDEWALK’S PLATFORM GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS 
We now turn from the troubled launch of the Sidewalk Toronto project to 
the main dangers of such a venture, if realized, to democratic governance.  
To some degree, this substantive critique stands on its own, independent of 
the secrecy and slipperiness of the launch process.  But in other respects, the 
initial process deficiencies represent and intensify concerns related to the 
imagined city.  After describing Sidewalk’s vision for Toronto’s smart city 
platform, based principally on a close reading of the vision section of 
Sidewalk’s submitted response to the RFP,131 as elaborated in public 
statements over the first eighteen months of the project, we identify three 
major pitfalls for the public:  privatization, platformization, and domination. 
A.  The City as Platform:  Sidewalk’s Vision 
One of the central rhetorical pivots of Sidewalk’s imaginings for the 
Toronto waterfront is what it terms the “digital layer.”  The digital layer is an 
animating idea for the project, rather than a material reality.132  The digital 
layer runs through, under, and around the “physical layer” of the built 
environment.  It consists of data and the things data touches, like sensors and 
cameras, data analytics and storage, wireless and wired infrastructure, and 
portals and devices.  The digital layer is in essence Sidewalk’s version of the 
“platform concept,” which creates “the baseline conditions for urban 
innovation.”133  With the use of this language, Sidewalk explicitly adopts the 
metaphor of the “city as platform”134 and invites the city itself to emulate the 
 
 131. Request for Proposals No. 2017-13 Response:  Project Vision, SIDEWALK LABS (Oct. 
17, 2017), https://storage.googleapis.com/sidewalk-toronto-ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/ 
13210553/Sidewalk-Labs-Vision-Sections-of-RFP-Submission.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZTM-
Q6J9] [hereinafter Vision].  Only a portion of Sidewalk’s response to the RFP has been made 
public. 
 132. Sidewalk Toronto, Meet Sidewalk Toronto:  Kristina and Craig Talk Open Urban 
Data, YOUTUBE (Mar. 29, 2018), https://youtu.be/LKN_EHkjCcs [https://perma.cc/MUY3-
QTHH]. 
 133. Vision, supra note 131, at 17. 
 134. This formulation has been used elsewhere as an analytical frame for digitally 
networked urban governance. See generally, e.g., DAVID BOLLIER, ASPEN INST., THE CITY AS 
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platform technology companies like Amazon and Google that cities hope to 
attract.135  Sidewalk sells the digital layer as the engine for the edge 
innovation, the startups, and the tech businesses of the silicon idyll. 
Figure 1:  The City as Platform136 
 
In the idealized city as platform, ubiquitous sensors will feed data into 
automated street design, turning streets as needed into conduits for bikes or 
pedestrians or priority vehicles.  Data will enable flexible use of streets, 
buildings, and public space as changing demands are sensed and datafied.  
Responsive applications built on top of the platform can efficiently deliver 
services (from food to sanitation to work space) “just-in-time” for public 
consumption.  The platform design explicitly recapitulates the internet’s 
network architecture:   
Just as computer and smartphone operating systems keep the device 
running smoothly but also allow innovators to create new apps, the digital 
layer is designed to keep the city running smoothly but also encourage 
residents, staff, startups, and larger companies to bring their most creative 
ideas to bear on improving life in the city.137 
 
PLATFORM:  HOW DIGITAL NETWORKS ARE CHANGING URBAN LIFE AND GOVERNANCE (2016), 
http://csreports.aspeninstitute.org/documents/CityAsPlatform.pdf [https://perma.cc/JLL7-
RA55]; STEPHEN GOLDSMITH & NEIL KLEIMAN, A NEW CITY O/S:  THE POWER OF OPEN, 
COLLABORATIVE, AND DISTRIBUTED GOVERNANCE (2017); Tim O’Reilly, Government as a 
Platform, INNOVATIONS, Jan. 2011, at 13. 
 135. See generally Jathan Sadowski & Roy Bendor, Selling Smartness:  Corporate 
Narratives and the Smart City as a Sociotechnical Imaginary, 440 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 
540 (2018). 
 136. Vision, supra note 131, app. at 19. 
 137. Id. at 66. 
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Indeed, in 2016, Sidewalk analogized the city to the network stack of a 
computer operating system, in which citizen services and even city 
administration itself become just user-facing applications, driven through the 
digital layer.138  This is “public administration as app,” with policy and 
accountability pushed to the edge of a network run on infrastructure owned 
and operated by someone else. 
Figure 2:  The City as a Network Stack139 
 
Sidewalk’s vision for Toronto’s eastern waterfront is a network of 
neighborhoods “networked . . . to operate at a system scale, like the internet, 
generating advantages that increase with each new node.”140  The internet, as 
a network of networks, confers obvious connectivity advantages.  But what 
is the advantage of networked neighborhoods when one of the meanings of 
neighborhood is to be distinct and set apart?  In Sidewalk’s vision, it is to 
attract businesses to supply goods and services through the platform.  
“Whereas a neighbourhood of a few thousand people will produce a modest 
market opportunity to attract third parties to the platform, a district of 
networked neighbourhoods will be powerful enough to draw companies and 
entrepreneurs from all over to take part in Toronto’s new ecosystem.”141 
In all aspects of Sidewalk’s envisioned city design, data is infrastructural.  
It is the foundation for all downstream production of goods and services.142  
 
 138. Sidewalk Labs, Reimagining the City as a Digital Platform, YOUTUBE (Feb. 22, 
2016), https://youtu.be/bPu8HvD7d9U [https://perma.cc/HT6C-8UJY] (“What if you could 
innovate across the whole stack, all at once . . . in a city?”). 
 139. Id.  
 140. See Vision, supra note 131, at 21. 
 141. Id.; see also id. at 51–54 (describing the eastern waterfront as a “[n]eighbourhood of 
neighbourhoods”). 
 142. See generally BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE:  THE SOCIAL VALUE OF 
SHARED RESOURCES 61–114 (2012); Jean-Christophe Plantin et al., Infrastructure Studies 
Meet Platform Studies in the Age of Google and Facebook, 20 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 293 
(2018). 
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Private functions like commerce, public ones like building inspections, and 
hybrid ones like housing or transportation are all mediated by data flows, 
predictive analytics, and automated decisions.  Urban governance is 
reconceptualized as facilitating the collection and transmission of data to 
applications and services that run on top of the platform.143  In effect, the city 
morphs from polis to bazaar, from a place of thick ties to thin transactions 
where digital bids connect people to services and applications. 
B.  Privatization 
The marketplace model for the city highlights the business orientation of 
a project that from the start failed the first test of public administration:  
engaging the governed.144  Even with formal institutional approval at the 
outset, there is a danger that a project like Sidewalk Toronto achieves private 
gain at the expense of the public—incrementally but comprehensively, from 
planning to implementation.  Above, we discussed IP ownership and data 
control, through which the privatization of public assets can be achieved 
alongside old-fashioned land deals.  Here, we turn to governance. 
Hidden in Sidewalk’s fine renderings of mass timber construction, 
adaptable roads, and configurable parks lies the most significant feature of 
the deal: the substantial delegation of public governance to a private 
platform.  Whoever controls the “digital layer” of the city exerts control over 
the activities transacted through it.  Sidewalk designed the digital layer and 
Sidewalk affiliates may operate it, intermediating access to traditional public 
spaces and services, like the curb, sidewalks, parks, and transport, as well as 
to private ones, like housing, health, and thermostats.  As more and more of 
life is transacted through the digital layer, regulation and its reach are 
encoded in that layer, as discussed below.145 
WT signaled out of the gate that it was willing to cede governance.  Its 
RFP sought a partner to “create the required governance constructs to 
stimulate the growth of an urban innovation cluster, including legal 
frameworks (e.g., intellectual property, privacy, data sharing).”146  From the 
start, a public entity tasked a vendor, doing service also as developer and 
planner, with making public policy.  Among the most important levers of 
urban governance are planning, regulation, and enforcement.147  Sidewalk, 
 
 143. Another layer—the “standards layer”—provides an interface between the digital layer 
and the “residents, administrators, and developers using and building atop the platform.” 
Vision, supra note 131, at 18. 
 144. The public fora that Sidewalk Toronto hosted did not meet the mark.  They skated 
over data collection, procurement, IP, and other issues, while focusing public attention on 
much less contested questions about building materials and amenities. 
 145. If code is law, then the digital layer, embodying code, is law. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, 
CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 6 (1999). 
 146. See RFP, supra note 15, at 17. 
 147. JONATHAN F. P. ROSE, THE WELL-TEMPERED CITY:  WHAT MODERN SCIENCE, ANCIENT 
CIVILIZATIONS, AND HUMAN NATURE TEACH US ABOUT THE FUTURE OF URBAN LIFE 138 
(2016) (identifying several levers of city control:  “vision of the city; a master plan for how to 
implement the vision, with specific indicators of its components; data collection so that the 
city has intelligence about its circumstances and can create feedback mechanisms to [achieve 
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like any company in this position, may be able to exert significant control 
over how all are conducted, with no credible social license for doing so. 
1.  Planning 
Simply by wielding the “pen” in designing the master plan for Toronto’s 
new neighborhood, Sidewalk has exercised a significant public planning 
function.  Many cities have “digital master plans”148 or “smart city” plans 
that are city-led.149  The city and its residents identify the problems and 
define the solution space.  With Sidewalk Toronto, by contrast, Sidewalk 
defines the problems and the solutions that Alphabet companies, it seems, 
will be uniquely positioned to supply.  Sidewalk may design the arena for its 
own advantage and then play in it as a real property “vertical developer,”150 
as a digital layer (perhaps sole-source) vendor, and as an infrastructure 
owner.151 
Though Sidewalk boasted that it undertook unprecedented public 
engagement in the lead-up to the MIDP—consulting “literally 20,000 
people”152—the detailed chronology set out in Part I above shows that the 
public and responsible authorities were blocked from the real action.  The 
Framework Agreement, which governed the first nine-and-a-half months of 
the deal, was pushed through the WT board without enabling time for 
deliberation, consensus, or amendment.  City councilors and citizens were 
not shown the agreement until it was obsolete, replaced by a new agreement, 
the PDA.  Again, that agreement was formed in private, ushering in facts on 
the ground without public deliberation or engagement.  It is difficult to know 
where to anchor serious scrutiny.  On one day, Sidewalk dumped into the 
public realm two privately formed final agreements, problematic and 
unanticipated terms for ongoing procurement and intellectual property 
management, data governance nostrums, as well as sweeping design 
fantasies.153  And then there was the mystification of scope.  For at least 
fifteen months, the project partners framed the scope of the project as being 
principally about Quayside, a relatively modest twelve-acre waterfront site.  
 
its vision]; regulations, such as zoning and building codes; incentives, including tax credits 
and loan guarantees; and investments in infrastructure such as transportation, water, and sewer 
systems”). 
 148. Anthony Townsend & Stephen Lorimer, Digital Master Planning: An Emerging 
Strategic Practice in Global Cities (N.Y.U. Marron Inst. of Urban Mgmt., Working Paper No. 
25, 2015), https://marroninstitute.nyu.edu/uploads/content/Working_Paper_25_Digital_ 
Master_Planning.pdf [https://perma.cc/W5BR-A2R6] (describing the digital master plans of 
Chicago, London, San Francisco, Dublin, Singapore, and Hong Kong, as well as New York 
City’s “Roadmap” and Barcelona’s “Smart City Strategy,” both written in 2011). 
 149. See, e.g., CITY OF CHI., THE CITY OF CHICAGO TECHNOLOGY PLAN (2013), 
https://techplan.cityofchicago.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/cityofchicago-techplan.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VFQ5-VZ7J]; CITY OF PHILA., SMARTCITYPHL (2018), https:// 
www.phila.gov/media/20190204121858/SmartCityPHL-Roadmap.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
NR6Y-CV47]. 
 150. See PDA, supra note 10, at 6. 
 151. See Oved, supra note 14. 
 152. See Media Events, supra note 30. 
 153. See supra Part I.C. 
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In February 2019, however, it became apparent that the project really 
concerned the entire 880-acre waterfront stretch, which confirmed critics’ 
and cynics’ worst suspicions.154 
Meanwhile, the city and its citizens would have to wait for at least another 
eighteen months for the release of the MIDP, a document that would 
ultimately run over 1500 pages155 and was negotiated in secret along the lines 
of the earlier agreements.  While concerns about data governance and privacy 
were constantly volleyed between critics and defenders of the deal, these 
merely served to embed a sense of inevitability about the problematic aspects 
being examined here involving privatization, platformization, and 
domination.  At no point was there any capacity, either at the government 
level or within the processes of the project partners themselves, to surface 
and protect against any of these areas of concern. 
The privatization of planning proceeds apace as the imagined city 
develops.  In Sidewalk’s vision, the networked neighborhood is continuously 
planned even after the arena is built and the game is underway.  Digital layer 
data will enable ongoing modeling of urban infrastructure needs.  Indeed, 
Sidewalk envisions a “[m]odel component . . . [that] can simulate ‘what if’ 
scenarios for city operations to inform long-term planning decisions.”156  
Given the amount of data that Sidewalk is likely to have, its planning tools 
will have significant advantages over competitors and almost certainly boost 
Sidewalk’s prospects as a planner.  It seems likely that the model will be 
implemented by the Sidewalk affiliate Replica.  This tool creates data 
facsimiles of real populations by scrambling the personal data of real people 
into synthetic copies of “virtual” individuals.157  Replica has already proven 
to the satisfaction of one jurisdiction that its technology is without peer, 
having won a sole-source contract with the state of Illinois to provide 
mobility data.158 
 
 154. See supra Part I.B. 
 155. See Sidewalk Lab’s Proposal:  Master Innovation and Development Plan, QUAYSIDE, 
https://quaysideto.ca/sidewalk-labs-proposal-master-innovation-and-development-plan/ 
[https://perma.cc/Y7XM-7Y4S] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019); see also supra Part I.B. 
 156. NICOLAS DOUAY, URBAN PLANNING IN THE DIGITAL AGE 30 (2018).  Douay describes 
a generic big data algorithmic planning process as one that selects “the best choice according 
to the intentions, scripts or scenarios from which it was designed. . . .  [It embodies] visions 
of the world, the city as well as planning processes, even if these projections may be 
unconscious or at least not very explicit.” Id. 
 157. Sidewalk Labs, Replica:  A Next-Generation Urban Planning Tool, YOUTUBE (Aug. 
24, 2018), https://youtu.be/YKIrSUCeOtU [https://perma.cc/2QDX-RXZC] (explaining that 
Replica is “a tool to explore how, where, when, and why people move around a region” based 
on millions of people’s full details of daily life); see also Ava Kofman, Google’s Sidewalk 
Labs Plans to Package and Sell Location Data on Millions of Cellphones, INTERCEPT (Jan. 28, 
2019), https://theintercept.com/2019/01/28/google-alphabet-sidewalk-labs-replica-cellphone-
data/[ https://perma.cc/ZU5T-YUKG]. 
 158. Sidewalk Labs Replica Tool and Data Notice, ILL. DEP’T TRANSP., 
https://webapps.dot.illinois.gov/WCTB/ConstructionSupportNotice/BulletinItem/0ff7ba88-
81f7-4cd8-b24b-bc153d493725?page=1 [https://perma.cc/DW6G-HV4C] (last visited Oct. 6, 
2019) (Replica “uses a number of sources, including mobile carrier data, location data from 
third-party aggregators and Google location data, to generate travel data for a region. . . .  
[T]he data sample is not limited to only Android devices.  Additionally, these data are 
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2.  Regulation and Enforcement 
As discussed in Part I above, Sidewalk’s development of a data 
governance regime for Quayside provoked criticism that policymaking was 
being privatized without the normal process of hearings, open records, and 
accountability.159  This private lawmaking could become harder to see, but 
no less pronounced, after ground is broken and control moves to the “cloud” 
of data flows.  Control of data and data analytics confers regulatory power:  
permissions to and prohibitions against.  The digital layer, if realized 
according to Sidewalk’s vision, effectuates permissions and prohibitions, 
including those governing curbside parking and driving speeds, in all cases 
dynamic and demand-based.160  Such agility will require highly responsive 
and mutable law that leaves the details of “saying what the law is” and, 
perhaps even of enforcement, to the platform.  Land use and trash regulation 
provide two examples. 
When it comes to land, traditional Euclidean zoning deploys bureaucratic 
codes to specify distinct land uses, geographically separated, in order to limit 
negative externalities imposed on neighbors.161  Sidewalk envisions 
something different on the future waterfront:  an “outcome-based code to 
govern the built environment.”162  The code would consist of “a new set of 
simplified, highly responsive rules that focus more on monitoring outputs 
than broadly regulating inputs.”163  Land would not be zoned for residential 
or manufacturing purposes but instead opened up to flexible use, provided 
that the use does not exceed some measure of impact (e.g., noise, smoke, 
traffic) outside the “envelope” of exclusivity.  This vision of patrolling 
dynamically for negative externalities, rather than zoning for compatible 
uses, requires performance targets and “embedded sensing for real-time 
monitoring.”  Sidewalk nominates itself to develop this system of “automated 
regulation.”  Sidewalk’s procurement and development proposals put it in 
limina between the regulated and regulator and its automated zoning is ruled 
 
collected from individuals for months at a time, allowing for a complete picture of individual 
travel patterns.”)  According to the notice, the estimated award for providing this data over 
thirty-six months is US$3.6 million. Id. 
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debating it in the legislature, voting on it, recording that vote for the next election, then 
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mercenary just gets the job done, and gets paid.  There is no vote, no debate, no statute, no 
regulation, no accountability.”). 
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 161. See generally Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).  Another 
way to view traditional zoning is as a tool to preserve positive externalities, or the commons. 
See Sheila R. Foster & Christian Iaione, The City as a Commons, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 
281, 311–12 (2016) (“Through its system of separation and exclusion, zoning protects the 
commons, at various scales, by helping to create and then preserve the ‘character’ of the city, 
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 162. See Vision, supra note 131, at 120. 
 163. Id. 
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by public law.164  At the same time, it may enjoy “substantial forbearances 
from existing laws and regulations.”165 
The distance between regulation and enforcement can be short in an 
automated system.  Sidewalk claims that the outcome-based code “will 
reward positive behaviors and penalize negative ones.”166  What sort of 
process will there be around penalties?  Will outcomes simply be chosen by 
majority rule, dependent on constant connectivity and prompts?167  Will the 
government have the opportunity to set enforcement priorities?  Dystopic 
visions abound of a new cannon of “personalized law,”168 adjoined to 
constant surveillance or what Rob Kitchin calls “control creep” and 
“anticipatory governance.”169  Landlords in some cities are already taking 
advantage of smart apartments to remotely lock out tenants over alleged 
contractual violations.170  Might these private dispute resolutions, which 
complement or replace public ordering, be outsourced to the digital layer?  
And if they are, who will control the lawmaking resident in the code?  
Sidewalk’s command of the early stage of development suggests an answer. 
Another example, this time in trash disposal regulation, shows that even if 
the government sets regulatory standards and enforces them, control over 
data can serve a de facto private lawmaking function.  Sidewalk expects to 
“deploy a digitally enabled smart chute system that will help pay-as-you-
throw waste regimes succeed in multifamily buildings by making it possible 
to differentiate between recyclables and trash.”171  In other words, the data 
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 166. Id. 
 167. Sidewalk’s head of engineering, Craig Nevill-Manning, uses an example of what is 
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can quickly survey everybody who lives around and get them to say, sort of, thumbs up, 
thumbs down; if we get enough thumbs up, kind of, the permit is automatically issued.” 
Sidewalk Toronto, supra note 132. 
 168. The University of Chicago Law Review recently held a symposium on the topic of 
“personalized law.” See Symposium on Personalized Law, U. CHI. L. REV., 
http://lawreview.uchicago.edu/symposium-personalized-law [https://perma.cc/BB7P-TXY4] 
(last visited Oct. 6, 2019). 
 169. See KITCHIN, supra note 117, at 178–79; see also Torin Monahan, Surveillance as 
Governance:  Social Inequality and the Pursuit of Democratic Surveillance, in SURVEILLANCE 
AND DEMOCRACY 91, 98 (K. D. Haggerty & M. Samatas eds., 2010); Jathan Sadowski & Frank 
Pasquale, A Spectrum of Control:  A Social Theory of the Smart City, FIRST MONDAY (July 6, 
2015), https://firstmonday.org/article/view/5903/4660 [https://perma.cc/DL8K-F2YF] 
(discussing Lawrence Solum’s thought experiment about the thoroughly instrumented city 
simply lifting traffic offenders from the streets with strategically placed cranes). 
 170. Alfred Ng, Tenants Worry Smart-Home Tech Could Be Abused by Landlords, CNET 
(Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.cnet.com/news/tenants-worry-smart-home-tech-could-be-
abused-by-landlords/ [https://perma.cc/99SY-DNV8]. 
 171. See Vision, supra note 131, at 22.  Elsewhere, Sidewalk Labs says that the only sensors 
it “expects to deploy include (1) air quality sensors (carbon monoxide, particulate matter, 
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location tracking is also within view. 
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about disposal patterns—some of it invariably sensitive and revealing172—
will be used to meter disposal fees.  This data may be combined with other 
personal data to “nudge” individual consumption and disposal habits and 
might become what Karen Yeung has called a “hypernudge.”173  Sidewalk 
will apparently control this sensor-based chute data.  City officials will access 
this data through an app, like any other user.  The city, in this vision, is 
reduced to a client.  It stands in the shoes of the third-party app developer, 
with no greater access or authority than any other player.174 
C.  Platformization 
Sidewalk’s vision raises another consequential concern for urban 
governance that is harder to define:  these are the issues inherent in a city-as-
platform model that radically unbundles systems, spaces, and services into 
sets of transactions optimized according to market logic.  The model has been 
theorized as a way of using public data to catalyze economic activity and 
improve city services.175  In broad strokes, there are two distinct versions of 
platform values.  In one version, the city intermediates between the public’s 
data and service providers, prioritizing public benefit.  In the other, 
commercial platforms like Facebook and Uber intermediate, prioritizing 
profit or market share.  Sidewalk obscures just which version of platform its 
digital layer will be and what it will be optimized for. 
The primary function of Sidewalk’s digital layer is to “collect[] data on the 
urban environment via sensors.”176  Who is doing the collecting is left vague.  
In some iterations, the disembodied platform is itself the agent.  It “detects 
pedestrian congestion,” for example, and then it “can experiment with ways 
to create better pedestrian flow.”177  This suggests that maybe the platform 
will be public in some sense, like basic infrastructure, and commercial 
entities will access it from the edge.  Elsewhere, Sidewalk itself claims 
agency.  It is Sidewalk that will “experiment . . . with various weather 
mitigation strategies . . . [and] get real-time feedback . . . from a high-density 
mesh of sensors . . . [to] enable the real-time evaluation of different 
interventions.”178  In this case, it seems that the platform will be commercial.  
Commercial entities, or at least Sidewalk, will provide the utility. 
 
 172. Ann Cavoukian Talks About Civil Liberties Group and Sidewalk Labs, JOHN OAKLEY 
SHOW (Apr. 18, 2019), https://omny.fm/shows/the-john-oakley-show/ann-cavoukian-talks-
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 173. See generally Karen Yeung, ‘Hypernudge’:  Big Data as a Mode of Regulation by 
Design, 20 INFO. COMM. & SOC’Y 118 (2017). 
 174. See Digital Strategy Advisory Panel Technology Update, SIDEWALK TORONTO (Dec. 
13, 2018), https://storage.googleapis.com/sidewalk-toronto-ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/ 
13210444/12.13.18_SWL_DSAP.pdf [https://perma.cc/HL6M-UDBN]. 
 175. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
 176. See Vision, supra note 131, at 33. 
 177. Id. at 79. 
 178. Id.  When a company is allowed to deploy sensors in exchange for feeding the data to 
the city, the city’s access to that data depends on the continuation of the deal.  LinkNYC kiosks 
allow Sidewalk to gather environmental data the city needs “to meet public health regulations 
and figure out the ‘livability’ of streets” in exchange for giving the company “a playground 
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Crucially, ambiguity about the platform depoliticizes questions of 
planning, frustrates accountability, and removes points of entry for citizen 
contestation.  Because the digital layer is conspicuously designed with the 
internet as a model, it seems only appropriate to extrapolate platform values 
from existing digital platforms.  Chief among them are efficiency and 
datafication, both of which are problematic as foundational values for cities 
and urban life. 
1.  Efficiency 
The presentation of the digital layer in Sidewalk’s vision demonstrates 
something of the nonchalant “no worries” assurances of neutrality that 
accompanied the rollout of information platforms in the early 2000s.  
Tarleton Gillespie points out that the metaphor of the platform as a “raised 
level surface” abets the claim of neutrality.179  But platforms are not 
neutral.180  Online platforms “intervene in and reshape value regimes and 
economies.”181  They advance a substantive vision of the good—whether that 
is “engagement” on social media or cheap rides through Uber—and enforce 
that vision through data flows.182  Similarly, smart city technologies might 
be “portrayed and positioned as technical, pragmatic, common-sensical, and 
non-ideological,” but in reality, they “are inherently politically and 
ideologically loaded in vision and application, reshaping in particular ways 
how cities are managed and regulated.”183 
To be sure, Sidewalk’s vision aims to hit ambitious targets for affordable 
housing, sustainability, inclusion, and other public goods.184  These are 
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(2010) (elaborating on the meanings of “platform” and the canny use of the term to suggest “a 
progressive and egalitarian arrangement, promising to support those who stand upon it,” while 
eliding the exclusionary and directive possibilities of particular platform arrangements). 
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McFarlane eds., 2015). 
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values imposed from outside the platform, congruent with Sidewalk’s 
ambitions to build in Toronto an idealized prototype, uninhibited by revenue 
demands and supported by patient capital.  But the values structurally 
embedded in the platform are not these.  The city as platform privileges 
efficiency.185  In Sidewalk’s vision, living, working, and moving—and, as 
discussed in the previous section, governing—are all modules on a platform 
connecting users to services through data.  Here is where Sidewalk’s 
definition of “urban data” (i.e., data collected in a physical space in the city) 
comes into its own and has its most pernicious effects.  Essentially, apart 
from completely personally owned spaces and devices—an increasing rarity 
in the envisioned waterfront—all places become exposed and marketized.  
Formerly static assets—whether that is park space, curb space, marketspace, 
office space, or housing space—are provided “as a service,” just-in-time, 
according to usage needs.186  Planning is a continuous process that happens 
in real time in response to flows of urban data, so that urban resources are 
allocated to entertainment, quiet reflection, food trucks, cycling, or housing 
based on constantly refreshing data inputs about demand, possibly filtered 
through the profit motive of platform players. 
As Adam Greenfield has observed, platform technics reduce friction 
between impulse and consumption.187  The ease of platform-mediated 
consumption can “short-circuit the process of reflection that stands between 
one’s recognition of a desire and its fulfillment via the market.”188  It is 
possible that the demand the platform registers should not be gratified upon 
considered reflection or upon considering the collective good.  If we imagine 
that in any given moment, there is more demand to play soccer in a field than 
to reseed it, the platform will deliver soccer.  If there is more demand 
(measured by those placing the most orders) for instant drone delivery than 
for a walk to the corner shop, retail will succumb.  This is the continuous 
planning process that currently favors cheap ride-shares over public 
transportation.  A brutally efficient demand-driven city-as-platform model 
might perhaps be able to accommodate public interests by accounting for 
negative and positive externalities in the model (e.g., congestion pricing).  
For this to happen, regulators and coders would have to collaborate.  The 




 185. See KITCHIN, supra note 117, at 113–27. 
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coupled with the embrace of privatized regulation, undermines confidence 
that such a collaboration would work in the public interest. 
Platform discourse tends to avoid the tensions between the public interest, 
on one side, and efficiency or market value on the other.  It fuses them.  José 
van Dijck observes that, “[i]n the platform society, the creation of public 
value toward the common good is often confused with the creation of 
economic value serving a nondescript amalgam of private and public 
interests.”189  Sidewalk incorporates public value concepts, leaning on Jane 
Jacobs’s vision of “placemaking” along with new urbanism and 
sustainability.  Sidewalk says it wants to pursue “[s]ocial cohesion and civic 
engagement.”190  These are the public values exogenous to the platform.  But 
the method offered to attain these values is always and only digital 
connectivity—the platform.  Again, if the digital layer is controlled by the 
public or their representatives, according to public standards, checks, and 
balances, it could conceivably be optimized for the public interest.  But if 
controlled by Sidewalk or other commercial vendors, it will most likely be 
optimized for efficiency and the efficient production of material value. 
2.  Datafication 
Platforms designed for efficiency break down the material and social 
world into data flows.  All activities—work, leisure in public, leisure in 
private, transport—are part of the flow.  The built environment will facilitate 
the data flow and be constructed by it.  If allowed to, platforms will try to 
parse every bit of existence into data.  This kind of datafication has prosocial 
and antisocial implications. 
On the “pro” side, structures “optimized for optionality”191 create 
flexibility in urban shelter.  Sidewalk depicts lofts that are designed to park 
cars until such time as autonomous vehicles reduce the demand for parking; 
thereafter they can be repurposed, floor-by-floor, pod-by-pod, for residential 
or other use.  Such “radical mixed-use”192 can in theory create more 
affordable housing and “incremental real estate value.”193  In addition, the 
“radical sharing of durable goods,”194 like cars, home appliances, and tools, 
can, again in theory, improve efficiency and reduce resource use. 
On the “anti” side, the atomization of space into modules for work and 
sleep enacts a new scheme of value extraction in space that can effectuate 
“the extension of economic rationality into every corner of human life.”195  
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 192. Id. at 52–53. 
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Whatever can be counted can be turned into data to facilitate exchanges and 
to justify total oversight of the expenditure of time.  Sidewalk imagines 
Toronto’s future waterfront as a place that has eliminated “the divide between 
home, work, and play.”196  As sensors fill the home and cover the body, 
market logic may penetrate into the crevices and core of private life.  It is one 
thing to pay a trash disposal fee.  But the conversion of all relationships (even 
if just to things) to an infinite set of use-based, chargeable events means that 
every interaction is monitored, measured, and marketized.197  When nothing 
is owned but only leased on a fractional, per-use basis,198 gone is the freedom 
and tolerance to gift or to over- and underuse,199 to avoid near-perfect price 
discrimination,200 or to have a reasonably exercisable “freedom to be off”—
to be “free from systemic, environmentally architected human 
engineering.”201 
This kind of “just-in-time” resource allocation will have a particular cast.  
It will be very responsive to inputs that are easily measured, to demands 
easily expressed in real time, and to desires that can be monetized.  However, 
some data that should be used as an input will not be counted in part because 
the people or places are not instrumented.  Shannon Mattern asks in 
connection with another smart city project, “[w]hat about all those potential 
behaviors that are never enacted, and thus never measured, because the 
physical space or its regulation prohibits them—or because one’s subjectivity 
proscribes a repertoire of possible behaviors?”202  The existence of data 
divides203—people whose data are not counted—will inflect datafication 
with inequality. 
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The efficiency gains to be extracted from “radical” mixed-use may be 
radically offset in other ways.  First, the reliance on real-time and constant 
data flows, data management, and computationally intensive infrastructure is 
clearly not costless in terms of energy.204  Reliability and maintenance 
impose other costs.205  And the impact is not only material—in a state of total 
digital dependence, internet connectivity as well as hardware and software 
maintenance becomes more than an annoyance and a forbearance; it becomes 
critical to life quality and sustenance.  Second, there are the practical 
implications of mixed-use and sharing, which reflect in many ways the 
realities that motivate private ownership and responsibility arrangements.  
Whole new systems and structures, likely onerous in surveillance and 
enforcement capacity, are required to manage, clean, maintain, and secure 
the spaces and things that are subject to radical sharing practices,206 which 
create attendant and novel challenges.207 
D.  Domination 
Ben Green writes that the “architecture of the smart city is a fundamentally 
undemocratic one” because the technologies “create massive information and 
power asymmetries that favor governments and companies over those they 
track and analyze, breeding impotence and subjugation.”208  The 
privatization and platformization risks we discuss above can be sources of 
subjugation for the individual and the collective.  Here, we address how an 
ambitious smart city project like Sidewalk Toronto can neuter the city’s 
sovereign powers, using the examples of domination through rights-of-way 
and tech interfaces. 
The risks of domination are much higher when the smart city architect is 
as dominant in data as Alphabet and its principal moneymaker, Google.209  
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Its ability to sink patient capital into infrastructure and other loss leaders 
allows it to wait out potential competitors, leverage the network effects of 
affiliated services, and close off opportunities for citizens or cities to opt out 
of emerging technology systems.  Sidewalk Toronto generates “techlash,” 
the remonstrance against the power of big tech, primarily because it is an 
Alphabet-Google project.210  Indeed, Sidewalk Toronto is a perfect storm for 
techlash, involving as it does issues of data governance, surveillance, 
efficiency optimization, information asymmetries, privatization, and hidden 
agendas.  The project feeds anxiety over domination by large, unaccountable 
big data systems and the asymmetric knowledge they produce. 
1.  Rights-of-Way 
The right-of-way is a precious “natural” urban resource.  We do not here 
rely on the fine points of Canadian law regarding cities’ proprietary interests 
in these rights-of-way but rather on the general legal principle derived from 
Roman law that cities manage public ways (owning them in fee or as 
easements) for the benefit of the community.211  It is a principle recognized 
by Canadian courts212 alongside American ones.213  Smart city developers 
require access to public streets, sidewalks, underground and overhead 
conduits, and pole installations to support platform services and underlying 
connectivity.  If a developer can dominate the city’s right-of-way and 
franchising or licensing process, it can in effect plunder this resource and 
subvert the public trust. 
Sidewalk imagines the digital layer as a great public infrastructure project 
in the tradition of the aqueducts of Rome, the London Underground, and the 
street grid of Manhattan.214  The city’s role and the public’s stake in this 
infrastructure is not clear, as discussed above.  The passive voice 
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predominates.  There will be a “key investment . . . to create a system of 
utility channels to accommodate all networked utilities . . . [to] provide space 
for electric wires, telecom conduits, and water and district heating pipes, as 
well as space for small-scale robots to travel between building basements and 
under walkable streets.”215  Questions abound about whose investment this 
will be (Sidewalk likes to speak of “catalyzing the financing” of such a 
project, with an expectation of a “reasonable” return),216 the role of Google-
affiliated companies, and control of the utility channel.  Then there is the 
question of how those “utility” companies will interact with urban rights-of-
way. 
Some cautions emerge from another experimental Google project in North 
America.  Google Fiber, now under the umbrella of Alphabet’s Access 
division, is, like Sidewalk, one of the Google-Alphabet empire’s “big bets.”  
This means it is a company with the patient capital to test and scale a 
technology without having to be financially successful.  In 2010, Google 
Fiber announced, with its signature primary color cheer, a competition that 
sent American cities scrambling.217  It would lay gigabit fiber in some 
number of lucky cities.  Like Sidewalk, Google Fiber offered cities the 
prospect of innovative services and plaudits. There were similar appeals to 
the prosocial advantages of the technology rollout.  City managers were 
invited to “imagine sitting in a rural health clinic, streaming three-
dimensional medical imaging over the web . . . [o]r collaborating with 
classmates around the world while watching live 3-D video of a university 
lecture.”218  There were also promises to advance what was the progressive 
tech policy agenda du jour:  net neutrality. Google Fiber promised it would 
build an “‘open access’ network . . . [operated] in an open, non-
discriminatory and transparent way.”219  As with Sidewalk Toronto, there 
was no clear revenue model.220  As some fear will happen with Sidewalk 
Toronto, Google Fiber’s public-minded language about building a utility 
faded into the reality of a consumer product offered to the rich.221 
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Cities jumped to attract Google Fiber to their streets.  They would clear 
impediments to their rights-of-way222 in return for better broadband and open 
networks.  More than 1000 cities made their offers, preening like hopeful 
suitors.223  Topeka even renamed itself “Google, Kansas”224 but was outdone 
by neighboring Kansas City, Missouri.225  Google entered into a 
development agreement with Kansas City in 2011.226  The city let Google 
choose where to deploy, so long as the company made the service available 
to “economically distressed” communities.  In return, the city supplied 
“assets and infrastructure” at no charge.227  It also promised to allow Google 
employees to set up shop in city offices and to deploy dedicated municipal 
personnel to work with Google.228  While the agreement did not commit 
Google to offer an open platform, the company had represented that it would, 
in keeping with its public positions in favor of net neutrality.229 
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Google executives “employed the construction of the railroads in the 
1800s as a metaphor for the growth, innovation and transformation that 
Google Fiber would provide” to residents.230  These benefits, they promised, 
would extend to low-income communities.  As it turned out, a demand-based 
model meant that only the wealthier neighborhoods signed up in sufficient 
numbers for the service.  While nominally making the service available to 
underserved communities, Google in fact did not deploy the service where 
consumer “demand” lagged.231  Nor did it retain its commitment to the most 
robust expression of net neutrality principles.232  The analogy to railroad 
rights-of-way may have been more apt than Google realized.  To be sure, 
railroads spurred economic dynamism.  They also used these gains to seize 
territorial and financial concessions from government.233  In the end, Kansas 
City did get better broadband but not all that was promised.  Its local paper 
editorialized ruefully:  “Google Fiber hasn’t changed the world, or even this 
part of it.  That will be worth remembering the next time an amazing 
technology emerges from Silicon Valley.”234 
Another Google Fiber city, Louisville, Kentucky, traveled a different 
trajectory.  There, Google started experimenting in 2017 with a 
“nanotrenching” technology to see if it could cut the capital expenses of 
building out expensive fiber infrastructure.235  Louisville allowed the 
company to dig shallow trenches that barely buried the fiber.  The city was 
so committed to the success of this new entry that it even litigated on 
Google’s behalf against incumbent broadband providers to gain access for 
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Google to their utility poles.236  Google’s experiment ended in 2019 when it 
decided to leave the city—and left cracked streets and exposed conduits in 
its wake.237  After public outcry, it agreed to pay the city to repair the 
streets.238 
What the Google Fiber experience shows is not that patient capital invested 
in fiber left the cities worse off than they were before (although in Louisville, 
it might have).  It is that the investment lured the cities into precarity by 
giving up rights-of-way without the means to control the franchisee.  Should 
Google Fiber have become dominant and leveraged that infrastructure to 
control data, wireless connectivity, and other elements of the digital layer, 
the cities could have not leaned on their rights-of-way to counter the 
dominance. 
2.  Application Interface 
While land is the most tangible public resource in the Toronto smart city 
deployment, there is also virtual infrastructure to consider.  Data is 
infrastructural and control over data is of central concern, as discussed above.  
In other cities, the application programming interface (API) is another piece 
of the digital infrastructure, control over which becomes an important piece 
of sovereignty.239  Sidewalk imagines for the Toronto waterfront an API that 
it would furnish to manage data access rights in the digital layer.  The API 
would provide for “regulated access to city data and the ability to interact 
with the city infrastructure in ways that are safe and consistent with other 
uses.”240  Sidewalk asserts that the API would be governed “by open 
standards” and support use by “third-party developers.”241  In other words, 
the API is Android for the city.242 
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The two things to note about this technological arrangement are that 
“open” does not mean egalitarian and that “third parties” include city 
managers.  An API owner has the final say over API use.  It can withdraw 
access to applications that seek to connect or it can boost its own applications 
over those of its competitors, as Google has done.243  The digital layer, 
Android-esque ecosystem will seem “open.”  But the initial and ongoing 
design choices will be Sidewalk’s or whoever designs it.244  As Ariel Ezrachi 
and Maurice Stucke write in relation to the experience with Android, Google 
is a “super-platform” that “can degrade the functionality of independent apps 
and online platforms . . . by reducing their performance and making them run 
slower . . . foreclose[ing] . . . timely access to critical data; [or] . . . 
preventing [them] from achieving the minimum efficient scale,” as well as 
by making it “harder for consumers to find” independent apps or giving 
“preferential treatment to its own or other competitive services.”245  Using 
the metaphor of the savanna, they describe the dominant mode of cooperation 
between super-platforms, platforms, and apps in capturing user data:  “They 
all benefit from the combined effort.  But they do not share equally the spoils; 
the dominant lion gets the best cut, which further enhances its power.”246 
Similarly, on the waterfront, Sidewalk presumably could withdraw access 
from or condition access to the digital layer’s API.  Applied to the city, API 
terms would influence regulatory authority.  Applied to third parties, they 
would influence competition.  For example, Sidewalk proposes to make 
curbside usage for parking, stopping, dining, building, or recreation available 
through the API.  One might have thought that collecting and providing 
access to this data would be a quintessentially public function.  But Sidewalk 
proposes its own “Coord” platform for this purpose.247  The data run through 
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this platform and API would likely include personal information like license 
plates (to automatically regulate and enforce traffic laws), as well as de-
identified data for usage or vehicle type.248  In order to get at this data, and 
therefore enforce parking laws or grant special usage permits, the city would 
have to go through the API.  The city, in other words, stands in the shoes of 
any other third party, subject to the choices of the API’s owner. 
Through the API deployed in Toronto’s waterfront, not only will the 
government access the necessary data to serve citizens but citizens will 
access government services.249  The digital dependency discussed above 
comes to be a dependency on the very same tech interface that the city too 
requires.  Citizen and city are bound together, not directly, but through 
mutual dependency on the same interfaces.  This is the case, for example, 
when cities use Facebook as the principal communications forum with their 
residents.250  The application provider’s terms of service, interconnection 
with other services, and technical affordances then constitute a form of urban 
control the city cannot easily resist. 
Techniques to avoid domination by API need to be developed and built 
into systems of urban governance, whether these are contractual obligations, 
regulations, or simply alternatives. 
CONCLUSION 
In its first eighteen months of existence, the Sidewalk Toronto project did 
not stray from Sidewalk’s original vision, notwithstanding pointed and well-
publicized public critique and revelations by a handful of admirably 
aggressive local journalists.  The vision has only consolidated, along with the 
collaboration between Sidewalk and WT, which presented a totally unified 
approach.  Most significantly for our purposes, despite the volume of interest 
and intensity of concern regarding the venture, no aspect of Sidewalk’s 
proposed vision for governance—and, in particular, no substantive aspect of 
data extraction, privatization, platformization, or monopolization—was aired 
for substantial challenge, refinement, or rescindment.  Instead, there was an 
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engagement,251 involving delayed information releases and staged 
consultations on already or nearly consummated agreements. 
The net effect is that while Sidewalk’s first-rate campaign to romance the 
city did not entirely succeed in its first stages, the project acquired global 
renown and a sense of inevitability, aided by a combination of lavishly 
funded publicity and coquettish mystery.  The release of the MIDP at the end 
of the period studied was another flashy and well-orchestrated set piece, and 
Sidewalk has continued as of this writing to wear any critique as “incredibly 
robust dialogue” that helps the firm to improve.252  The success of this 
strategy going forward is far from given, as Sidewalk’s tactics have hardened 
and tutored resistance to the project, leading to a growing grassroots 
#BlockSidewalk campaign, threats of legal action, and at least some 
indicators of more rigorous oversight from public officials.253 
As demonstrated in Part I, the process failures in the rollout of Sidewalk 
Toronto have been ample.  When combined with the substantive concerns set 
forth in Part II, they propose to dramatically change the structure of urban 
life and threaten public governance.  To recap the threats to governance 
demonstrated by Sidewalk’s original vision and evidenced through the first 
eighteen months of the project: 
(1) City planning and data management were referred to a private company 
that kept the public and public officials always one step or more behind the 
action. 
(2) Notwithstanding stated deference to public bodies, the project’s 
foundational provisions on intellectual property, data, and procurement, 
along with the basic blueprint, fundamentally disempower the public and 
serve the interests of the private company. 
(3) In the city as platform model, public administration is a mere app at the 
edge of centralized infrastructure owned and operated by a private company. 
(4) Regulation, lawmaking, and enforcement may be substantially taken 
over by the private company, which envisages a system of data-driven, 
outcome-based code that is highly personalized and dependent on a constant 
process of data extraction. 
(5) Through platformization and the accompanying logic of efficiency and 
datafication, previously fixed and static assets are reconceived as “just-in-
time updatable devices,” subject to data-enabled, single-use transactions.  
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This logic encourages frictionless satiation of impulse, magnifies existing 
inequalities, and undervalues human freedom and social cohesion. 
(6) Google experiments in other cities and domains teach that cities that 
readily hand over physical rights-of-way leave themselves servile to deep-
pocketed prospectors and that API control of data exchanges can augment 
unchecked platform power and deepen irreversible datafication. 
What emerges from these points and the prior analysis is not a grievance 
with technology nor with urban innovation per se.  It is with privatization, 
platformization, and domination.  It is with the centrality and hugely 
asymmetric power of a private corporate group—Alphabet-Google, through 
its affiliate Sidewalk—and the control it is able to exercise over nearly every 
aspect of the future district. 
Before the project reached this point, there might have been reasonable 
steps that Toronto, in conjunction with WT, could have taken to mitigate 
these concerns.  These might have included a requirement of impact 
assessments on every proposed service in the project; of independent review 
for each service; that Sidewalk pilot innovations at Quayside or Google 
facilities before broader deployment; that the city itself administer any data 
trust functionality and approve data collection in a cautionary, stepwise 
manner based on evidence and necessity; that the relevant governmental 
process conclude its own data governance rulemaking; that any intellectual 
property provision properly assess the value the public is bringing and ensure 
a reasonable return; and that ordinary procurement procedures apply at all 
stages of the redevelopment. 
After so much secrecy and legerdemain, these policy interventions may be 
too late if they leave the project’s essential blueprint in place.  Course 
corrections that are too timid and implicitly endorse and embed deep 
structural compromises into the heart of urban governance will drain the city 
of power.  The alternative, for Toronto and others, is to pursue urban 
innovation with private partners but only in a way that rejects a central role 
for any one company—and certainly any role of “co-master developer.”  
What Sidewalk has provided is a vision where its own upper hand in platform 
control, data governance, intellectual property, procurement, and access has 
at each turn an obvious and legitimate alternative:  the hand of the city itself. 
